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“For some of us it is performance, for others patronage. They are two sides of the same coin or, being as
there are so many of us, the same side of two coins.” --The Player, Rosencrantz & Guildenstern Are Dead

I. Introduction
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court set forth the prevention of “the actuality
and appearance of corruption” as a legitimate and (in the case of contributions)
compelling government interest in the regulation of campaign finance,1 a holding that
was emphatically reaffirmed in the Court’s recent BCRA decision.2 Buckley goes on to
say:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid
pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our
system of representative democracy is undermined…. Of almost equal
concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of
†
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appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial
contributions.3
Though the opinion as a whole – and, specifically, the invalidation of the Federal
Election Campaign Act’s (FECA) expenditure limits on First Amendment grounds – has
been assailed by many proponents of campaign finance reform,4 the anti-corruption
rationale remains vibrant and, with Buckley’s contribution/expenditure distinction, has
shaped the campaign finance landscape of the past twenty-five years.5 Most recently, the
Court in McConnell v. FEC upheld the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA) ban
on soft money (non-federal funds to party committees, unregulated by FECA) in federal
elections,6 recognizing that “the prevention of corruption or its appearance constitutes a
3

424 U.S. at 26-27.
Criticisms come in large part because of the way in which the ruling has been perceived to broaden
untenably the concept of money as protected speech. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Exchange; Speech in the
Welfare State: Free Speech Now, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 291 (1992) (likening the Buckley decision
unfavorably to Lochner v. New York); Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and
Campaign Finance, 86 Geo. L. J. 45, 46 (1997) (characterizing Buckley as “one of the most widely scorned
decisions in the recent history of the court”); Burt Neuborne, Campaign Finance Reform: The
Constitutional Questions: Buckley’s Analytical Flaws, 6 J.L. & Pol’y 111, 115 (1997) (opining that
“Buckley and the rules it fostered are responsible for much of what is wrong with our current political
structure”).
5
Both the rationale and the distinction have also come under fire as going too far in regulating campaign
finance, rather than not far enough. See, e.g., Robert F. Bauer, Going Nowhere Slowly: The Long Struggle
Over Campaign Finance Reform and Some Attempts at Explanation and Alternatives, 51 Cath. U. L. Rev.
741 (2002) (arguing that there is little empirical evidence that corruption is a real problem, and disfavoring
the contribution/expenditure distinction because it slights associative political rights). Additionally, some
commentators have suggested that other rationales than corruption should be the concern of campaign
finance reform. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 1369 (1994) (discussing the promotion of equality and the unshackling of politicians from
fundraising duties as valid reasons for reform, rather than the prevention of corruption).
6
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA, also known as the McCain-Feingold Act), Pub. L. No.
107-155, 116 Stat. 181 (2002). See also Michael J. Malbin, Thinking About Reform, in LIFE AFTER
REFORM: WHEN THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT MEETS POLITICS 8-11 (Michael J. Malbin, ed.)
(2003); The Center for Responsive Politics, “Federal Campaign Finance Law: New Contribution Limits,”
at http://www.opensecrets.org/basics/law/index.asp (last visited August 8, 2005). For a critical summary of
BCRA’s basic soft money provisions, see Richard Briffault, Soft Money Reform and the Constitution, 1
ELEC. L. J. 343 (2002). For a broad history of the constitutional issues surrounding campaign finance preBCRA, see D. Bruce La Pierre, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Political Parties, and the First
Amendment: Lessons from Missouri, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 1101 (2002); Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance
Reform: Relevant Constitutional Issues, 34 Ariz. St. L. J. 1123 (2002). For an analysis of the likely impact
of BCRA and McConnell, see Jonathan S. Krasno and Frank J. Sorauf, Evaluating the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. & SOC. CHANGE 121 (2003); Craig Holman and Joan
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sufficiently important interest to justify political contribution limits.”7 The torrent of soft
money seems largely to have been stemmed,8 but unlimited donations given to party
organizations are still legal in a number of states, subject only state regulations and to
BCRA’s restrictions on state party activity during a federal election.9 Ostensibly, such
money is used only for grass-roots, “party-building” purposes.10 Absent evidence to the
contrary, there is no reason to infer that party-building monies constitute part of an
impermissible quid pro quo transaction. By giving money to the party itself, the
argument goes, a donor is simply increasing that party’s resources and, in so doing,
attempting to advance in a generalized way the interests and policies that best align with
the donor’s own11 – just as, by giving money to a candidate, a donor is trying to
maximize that candidate’s chances at victory, and displaying a democratic preference for

Claybrook, Outside Groups in the New Campaign Finance Environment: The Meaning of BCRA and the
McConnell Decision, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2004).
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See Anthony Corrado, Thomas E. Mann, Daniel Ortiz, Trevor Potter, and Frank Sorauf, CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK, 163-77 (1997) [hereinafter “Sourcebook”] (chronicling the rise of soft
money contributions); The Center for Responsive Politics, “The Rise and Demise of Soft Money,” at
http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/toporgs/soft.asp (last visited August 8, 2005). Part II, infra, relates the
ways in which unregulated donations continue to make an impact at the federal level.
9
As of June 2004, fifteen states allowed unlimited contributions from any source to state party committees.
See National Conference on State Legislatures, “Limits on Contributions to Political Parties,” available at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/about/contrib_pol_parties.htm (last visited August 10,
2005)[hereinafter “State Party Contribution Limits”]. Note that in North Dakota and Pennsylvania,
corporations are prohibited from donating directly to a state party organization, but may do so through a
segregated fund. N.D. Cent. Code § 16.1-08.1-03.3 (2005); 25 PS § 3253 (2005). Some predict that the
success of BCRA will lead more states to ban soft money. See, e.g., Holman & Claybrook, supra note 6, at
n.5. Since the legitimation of BCRA, several states have already taken additional measures to regulate the
campaign finance process, enacting ‘pay-to-play’ statutes that “ban or limit state and local political
donations of employees who work for companies that bid for government contracts.” Kate Ackley, ‘Pay to
Play’ Fix is Backed By House, ROLL CALL, March 15, 2005 (describing such legislation in New Jersey,
South Carolina, Ohio, and West Virginia); see also Joseph Picard, GOP undecided on pay-to-play bill,
ASBURY PARK PRESS, February 27, 2005, at AA1 (reporting on New Jersey’s efforts).
10
See Sourcebook, supra note 8, at 163.
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Supporters of soft money credit its use with “a resurgence of the role of parties in national elections,” and
characterize it as “an essential means of promoting citizen participation in the political process.” Id. See
also 124 S. Ct. at 777-81 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that banning donations to political parties
burdens speech “that does not have the potential to corrupt federal candidates and officeholders,” and that
parties, inter alia, “foster speech crucial to a healthy democracy . . . and fulfill the need for like-minded
individuals to ban [sic] together and promote a political philosophy.”) (emphasis and citations omitted).
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them over other alternatives.12 Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s understandable caution
in the matter, it is not necessary to assume that donors to parties or to candidates do so to
seek specific ex post influence following the election; there are plausible reasons that do
not raise the specter of actual or perceived corruption, and for which the case for
regulation under Buckley and McConnell is murky at best.
But these reasons are surprisingly flimsy when it comes to one of the most
peculiar and, arguably, prevalent features of the current campaign finance system: the
practice of a single donor, whether on the state or federal level, giving sizeable
contributions to multiple parties, or to two candidates competing for the same office,
within a given election cycle.13 Here it makes no sense to say that the donor is just
exercising a democratic preference for a particular party or candidate; rather, by giving to
competing parties or candidates, the donor appears to be hedging its bets so that whatever
the outcome of the election, it will enjoy some benefit from its donation by having
backed the winner.14 As the McConnell Court observed, in finding that soft money
contributions “have a corrupting influence or give rise to the appearance of corruption,”15
12

What I term “democratic preferences” in this paper is similar to the “ideological sorting” theory
propounded by, among others, Steven G. Bronars & John R. Lott, Jr., Do Campaign Donations Alter How
a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do?, 40 J.
L. & ECON. 317, 347 (1997) (presenting evidence that “[j]ust like voters, contributors appear able to sort
into office politicians who intrinsically value the same things they do.”).
13
This practice, here termed “bet-hedging,” has received surprisingly little attention in the literature,
earning only passing mention in papers concerning themselves with other campaign finance issues.
Representatively, see Kurt D. Dykstra, Sending the Parties “PAC-ing”? The Constitution, Congressional
Control, and Campaign Spending After Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal
Elections Commission, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 1201, 1230 (1998) (“Some PACs will even contribute to the
‘general funds’ of both political parties, although usually the amounts given to each are not equal. In a
sense, this strategy might well be characterized as a ‘hedging all bets’ strategy: PACs want to be sure that
they do not end up entirely on the wrong side of the election so they will contribute to both candidates.”);
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV.
1705, 1714 (1999) (“The unflattering reality is that campaign expenditures are intended not only to
influence voter behavior but to curry favor with sympathetic elected officials…. [H]ence, the propensity of
many institutional actors to hedge their bets and contribute on both sides of important elections.”).
14
Although for shorthand purposes the term “bet-hedging” is used throughout this paper, and although all
commentators appear to assume that donors who give to both parties do so in order to mitigate the
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Particularly telling is the fact that, in 1996 and 2000, more than half of the
top 50 soft-money donors gave substantial sums to both major national
parties, leaving room for no other conclusion but that these donors were
seeking influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting any
particular ideology.16
This paper contends that, to the degree that such bet-hedging occurs, it carries with it a
strong prima facie implication of ex post favor- seeking in a way that contributions to a
single party or single candidate do not, and, therefore, can (constitutionally) and should
(normatively) be regulated or prohibited under the Buckley framework by Congress or by
state legislatures. Further, it argues that the free speech and associative rights inherent in
hedged-bet donations do not outweigh the potential threat that such donations pose to the
legitimacy of the political system or the public’s perception thereof; only the possible
effects of bet-hedging regulation on broader donor behavior militate against legislative
action.17
To put the bet-hedging phenomenon plainly: Mr. Dem and Mrs. Gop are running
against each other for a seat in the Senate. If Donor X, who has $40 to contribute, gives
it all to Mr. Dem’s campaign, it’s fair to infer that Donor X is displaying a preference for
Mr. Dem as a candidate (or for his party, platform, haircut, or stance on some issue,
which all amount to the same thing here). Similarly, if Donor Y gives its $40 to Mrs.
Gop’s campaign, the reasonable conclusion, assuming Donor Y is a rational actor, is that

uncertainty of democratic politics and assure that they will be backing the winner, it is important to note
that hedged-bet donations are most likely made for a number of reasons, several of which have nothing to
do with an expectation of ex post benefits. Moreover, to the extent that some donors do engage in strategic
bet-hedging behavior, pinpointing the degree to which bet-hedging occurs overall is very difficult:
donations made to each party in exchange for quid pro quo benefits from the victor (probably
impermissible under Buckley), for example, are in practice essentially indistinguishable from donations
made to each party in exchange for generalized access (probably permissible under Buckley). The problem
of parsing the prevalence of and motivations for hedged-bet donations is explored at greater length in Parts
III and IV, infra.
15
124 S. Ct. at 661.
16
Id. at 663 (emphasis in original).
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it prefers Mrs. Gop over Mr. Dem. But suppose Donor Z gives $20 to one candidate and
$20 to the other. What conclusion may be drawn from that? If the answer is that Donor
Z has no preference between the candidates, then why would Donor Z give any money at
all? Insofar as the purpose of campaign contributions is to advance the electoral
prospects of one candidate or party over another, giving to both sides is an irrational act;
because elections are zero-sum, the contributions cancel each other out.18 However, if
some donors contribute not simply to signal a preference, but in order to secure ex post
benefits, it makes sense for those donors to give to both candidates. As long as either
side can give Donor Z the benefits it seeks in exchange for a donation, and as long as the
winning candidate will provide Donor Z with the hoped-for benefits even if Donor Z
contributed to both sides,19 Donor Z is acting perfectly rationally by hedging its bets and
seeking to ensure a return on its investment.
Of course, behavior that is rational for a private donor might not be normatively
desirable for society as a whole. And when the amounts being given to both sides are not
usually $20, but $1 million – per donor, per election cycle – one presumes that the
expected ex post benefits must be significant.20 Whether the actual benefits accrued live
up to donors’ expectations, and whether either actual or expected benefits rise to the level

17

See Part V, infra.
Rather, the contributions cancel each other out if an equal amount is given to each side. If more money
is given to one side than the other, then only the difference between the contributions matters in the end.
That is, if $x is given to Candidate A and $x+y is given to competing Candidate B, only the donor’s
contribution of $y to Candidate B matters.
19
That is, whether donors who give to both sides receive fewer ex post benefits relative to “loyal” donors
who give to only one side – a consideration that is explored further in Part IV, infra.
20
Such numbers are, of course, an approximation of data examined more carefully in Part III, infra, and
reflect the pre-BCRA landscape of escalating soft money contributions to both major party committees.
The true calculation of dollars that will be spent in hedged-bet donations in the wake of the McConnell
decision is still largely uncertain; we are nearing the end of the first campaign cycle under BCRA.
However, as will be seen in Part II, there are several reasons to think that donors will continue to find ways
to give substantial amounts of money to competing candidates and parties, even if certain outlets have been
closed.
18
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of “political quid pro quo [undermining] the integrity of our system of representative
democracy,”21 is certainly contestable. Nevertheless, the phenomenon surely deserves a
more searching analysis than it has thus far received.
Part II of this paper briefly sketches the present state of campaign finance
regulation, explains why bet-hedging is an issue even in the wake of BCRA’s ban on
federal soft money, and lays out the general arguments for and against campaign reform.
Part III differentiates bet-hedging, in which competing parties or candidates are given
money in order to secure ex post benefits, from donation-splitting, in which alternative
explanations exist for similar behavior, and tries to determine the prevalence of the
former. Part IV raises a number of issues not heretofore explored regarding the practice
of bet-hedging, including a) the motivations behind bet-hedging; specifically, why donors
decide to give to competing parties or candidates, and what ex post benefits such donors
might seek; b) the process by which a donor decides how to split its money; c)
informational concerns inherent in bet-hedging; and d) how the closeness of an election
might change the degree to which donors are likely to hedge their bets. Part V analyzes
the possibility of regulating hedged-bet donations, both as a normative matter (should the
behavior be regulated?) and as a legal matter (can the behavior be regulated? how can the
regulations be most narrowly drawn?), testing the practice of bet-hedging against the
traditional arguments for unregulated political contributions. It concludes that, so long as
it is possible to distinguish instances of true bet-hedging from other, more benign forms
of political speech, regulation of hedged-bet donations is constitutional under Buckley’s
anti-corruption rationale. Normatively, however, the question is much tougher. While
the prevention of the appearance of corruption almost certainly is a constitutionally
21

424 U.S. at 26.
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sufficient justification for burdening the speech of donors who are hedging their bets,
such a burden will carry with it costs and consequences that may outweigh the positive
aspects of regulation. These consequences, as with the motivation behind and
effectiveness of the practice of bet-hedging itself, are unfortunately far from clear.

II. The Campaign Finance Landscape
A. Bet-Hedging post-BCRA
When the Supreme Court upheld the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, it
legitimized an earthshaking change upon the campaign finance landscape, the most
significant since the passage of FECA thirty years before. The effects of BCRA were felt
immediately: most notably, national party soft money is now banned; individual
contribution limits have been doubled, to $2,000 per cycle, and indexed for inflation; and
state, district, and local party committees operate under federal contribution limits for
elections in which a federal candidate is on the ballot.22 Although the practice of bethedging, I will argue, raises normative concerns in any context, it is tempting to think that
these reforms, by putting paid to million-dollar donations and other campaign finance
excesses, will remove much of the taint from donors’ decisions to give to both sides. If
the bulk of bet-hedging in the past has come through enormous soft money contributions,
and such contributions are now banned in federal elections, one might suppose that the
undesirable aspects of bet-hedging will diminish in turn.23

22

This last is subject to the Levin Amendment exception, which allows state and local committees’ voter
registration and get out the vote efforts to be “funded with soft money, limited to $10,000 per source, if
such contributions are allowed under state law.” Malbin, supra note 6, at 8.
23
See, e.g., Editorial, A Victory for Campaign Reform, THE OREGONIAN, December 11, 2003, at C8 (“On
balance, though, the McCain-Feingold law will be good for the political process. American democracy will
not miss the corrupting influence of soft money. It created a system of legalized bribery in which the major
parties regularly put the arm on large corporate donors, who often felt compelled to give to both sides,
either to win influence or avoid retaliation in Congress.”).
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Suppose it is true that a $25,000 check to each national party committee (the most
an individual can contribute to a national committee under the new rules) is less cause for
concern, analytically, than a $250,000 check. There are still several conduits, postBCRA, through which large sums can be transmitted from donors to political
organizations; those accustomed to hedging their bets in a big way can, and will, still do
so.24 Indeed, despite the ban on soft money, total giving to national party committees in
the 2004 election cycle exceeded 2000’s record-breaking totals.25
National party conventions, for example, have become “the chief means that
corporate donors have found to make large contributions to organizations benefiting
political parties” following BCRA’s ban on soft money.26 An exemption from campaign
finance laws for donations going to a party’s local “host committee,” originally intended
“to help promote local businesses,”27 has attracted numerous donations of $1 million or
more from corporations, labor unions, and non-profit foundations.28 Many of these
donors, moreover, are giving generously to both parties’ conventions – The New York
Times reports that of the 73 major donors listed for the Republican National Convention
as of June 2004, “20 have also given to the Democratic National Convention.”29 Largescale bet-hedging is alive and well after BCRA.

24

As the McConnell Court observes, “[m]oney, like water, will always find an outlet.” 124 S. Ct. at 706.
David Broder, A Win for Campaign Reform, Editorial, WASHINGTON POST, February 3, 2005, at A27
(stating that “the national party committees together raised $1.2 billion in hard money (regulated
contributions) in the 2004 election cycle, $140 million more than they had raised in hard and soft money
combined for the 2000 contest.”).
26
Michael Slackman, GOP Nearing Money Record for Convention, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 17, 2004,
at A1.
27
Id.
28
See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Thomas H. Edsell, For Lobbyists, Big Spending Means Big Presence, THE
WASHINGTON POST, July 28, 2004, at A1.
29
Slackman, supra note 26, at A1.
25
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Another avenue of potential private largesse is the proliferation of 527 groups,
ostensibly independent, tax-exempt advocacy organizations, to which donors, including
corporations and labor unions barred from contributing to parties and candidates, may
give unlimited amounts of money.30 So called after the section of the Internal Revenue
Code that grants the groups their tax-exempt status,31 527s are officially “unaffiliated”
with a party or candidate (such a designation is more fictive for some groups than others)
but spend their money electioneering, engaging in voter mobilization, issue ads, and get
out the vote efforts in order to forward their particular policy preferences.32 While 527s
have often comprised the political arms of unions and trade associations, the 2004
election cycle saw the strengthening of unabashedly partisan interest groups under the
527 umbrella, “the explicit purpose [of which] is to pick up where the national parties and
federal officeholders left off – that is, to raise huge sums of soft money from
corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals” and to spend that money “promoting and
attacking candidates.”33 For example, two Democratic interest groups working in
concert, The Media Fund and America Coming Together, combined to raise over $140
million in their efforts to defeat President Bush in the 2004 election.34 With 527s
spanning the political spectrum, donors have no shortage of options if they wish to
continue to make contributions in excess of the BCRA limits.35

30

See Holman & Claybrook, supra note 6, at 238 (arguing that 527 groups have “undermined the objective
of BCRA”).
31
I.R.C. 527 (2002).
32
See Holman & Claybrook, supra note 6, at 247-48.
33
Id. at 249.
34
The Center for Responsive Politics, “527 Committee Activity: Top 50 Organizations,” at
http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtes.asp (last visited August 14, 2005) [hereinafter “527
Committees”].
35
Interestingly, there are indications that bet-hedging is not nearly as prevalent among donations to
opposing 527 groups as it is for competing parties or competing candidates. The implications of this are
examined in Part IV, infra.
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Finally, as earlier noted, state elections are governed by state law and state
contribution limits, at least when no federal candidate is on the ballot. Twenty-seven
states do not limit contributions by individuals to state party committees; twenty-nine do
not limit contributions by PACs.36 Fifteen states allow unlimited donations by
corporations or unions,37 both of which have been prohibited from contributing to federal
elections for decades. The point is not necessarily that state elections are particularly
wild or woolly, or that the influence of big money holds some sort of special sway in
races for governor or assemblyman. Craig Holman and Joan Claybrook believe that
states will soon follow the lead of BCRA and institute far more stringent contribution
limits.38 They may well be right; indeed, in recent years a number of states have, even
before the passage of McCain-Feingold, severely tightened campaign giving restraints.39
But for now, money still flows liberally into the campaign coffers of state campaigns, and
bet-hedging behavior occurs with apparent frequency.40 Whether such behavior is
sufficiently worrisome to deserve regulatory attention is one thing (and for this
discussion, see Part V) – but to all appearances it does exist, and will continue to exist in
some substantial form even despite the sea change caused by BCRA.

36

State Party Contribution Limits, supra note 9.
Id.
38
Holman & Claybrook, supra note 6, at n.5. As mentioned in note 9, supra, the pay-to-play legislation
enacted by several states may be one indication of a renewed willingness to combat corruption at the state
level through campaign reform.
39
Alaska’s broad-based 1996 reforms, for example, were upheld by its Supreme Court in State v. Alaska
Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1153 (2000). And Louisiana barred an
entire industry from making campaign contributions. La. R.S. 18:105.2(L) (1999). The resultant case,
Casino Ass’n of Louisiana v. Louisiana, 820 So.2d 494 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1226 (2003), in
which the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the ban, is discussed in Part V, infra.
40
See Part III, infra.
37
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B. Arguments For and Against Campaign Finance Reform
In a 2002 paper, Robert Bauer characterizes the post-Buckley campaign finance
debate as afflicted with “muddled ferocity.”41 The truth of this characterization is due in
large part to the ideological rigidity with which both sides approach the issue; the law
review articles, Senate speeches, and op-ed pieces on the subject, while not lacking in
impassioned rhetoric, leave little sense even that the terms of the debate have been
mutually defined. More precisely, it is unclear what outcome, aside from “less money in
politics,” most reformers want – what problems, aside from the inchoate bugaboos of
“corruption” and “improper influence,” such reform, in its particulars, is designed to
address.42 And from the other side, repeated and single-minded appeals to free speech
often serve to obscure what is in many respects a subtle and complex set of issues.43 Nor
have the Supreme Court’s periodic forays into the doctrinal arena done much to make the
foundation for debate any clearer.44

41

Bauer, supra note 5, at 749.
See Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Legalism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. Chi. Legal F. 111,
111 (1995) (observing that “[m]any recent analyses of [campaign finance issues] rely on vaguely defined
moralistic terms such as ‘corruption,’ ‘unfairness,’ and ‘trusteeship’”).
43
Indeed, the “money-is-speech” talk itself appears willfully to ignore the substantive core of the Buckley
holding: that money-as-speech, like speech, may be regulated if the governmental interest is sufficiently
compelling. That Buckley specifically singles out contribution limits as a valid exercise of government
regulation is paid little heed by those scholars and politicians who invoke the First Amendment, and its use
by the Court in the portion of Buckley striking down ceilings on expenditures, to advocate that such
contribution limits be repealed or that further restrictions are by definition unduly burdensome of liberty or
speech interests. See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The First Amendment Needs No Reform:
Protecting Liberty from Campaign Finance “Reformers,” 51 Cath. U. L. Rev. 785 (2002); Debate on the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 148 Cong. Rec. S2096 [hereinafter “BCRA Debate”] (March
20, 2002) (Statements of Sens. Hutchison, Gramm, Stevens, and McConnell). But see Neuborne, supra
note 4, at 115-16 (criticizing the Court’s contribution-expenditure distinction as “logically untenable and
pragmatically disastrous” in part because it treats contributions as worthy of less First Amendment
protection).
44
See FEC v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604
(1996); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). In
2003, the Court also denied certiorari in Casino Ass’n of Louisiana v. Louisiana, 820 So.2d 494 (2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1226 (2003) (where the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the state’s outright
prohibition on campaign contributions from the casino industry, holding that prevention of corruption and
42
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Nevertheless, certain stock arguments for and against proposed reforms to
campaign finance recur with some regularity, and certain basic contentions have been
agreed upon by all (or nearly all) parties. First, proponents of a more restrictive system
of campaign finance argue that new campaign finance laws will be, or should be,
designed with one or more of four goals in mind: 1) the mitigation of corruption or 2) the
appearance thereof; 3) the facilitation of political fairness, as manifested in equality of
participation, access, or influence;45 and 4) the maximization of political autonomy, in
freeing politicians from the burden of perpetual fundraising and donors from the burden
of perpetual giving.46 Each of these goals, by extension, also serves to increase popular
confidence in the democratic legitimacy of the government. Furthermore, implicit in the
call for reform is the belief that the furtherance of these goals outweighs countervailing
interests of free speech, associative rights, and the aggregation of democratic preferences.
Similarly, opponents of restrictive campaign finance laws rely on several
objections: 1) that campaign contributions advance democracy by allowing donors to
back those candidates or parties whose preferences or policy goals most nearly match
their own;47 2) that campaign finance regulation represents an unconstitutional abrogation
of freedom of speech; and 3) that campaign finance regulation limits a donor’s right to
political association.48 Implicit in these arguments is a belief that the threat to free

the appearance of corruption was a sufficient interest to allow a prohibition on contributions in this case).
Casino Ass’n is discussed further in Part V, infra.
45
See Cain, supra note 42, at 130-39 (discussing equity issues – fairness of participation, influence, and
outcome – in the context of campaign finance regulation).
46
See Cain, supra note 42, at 124-25 (noting lobbyists’ claim that legislators extort campaign
contributions); Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1055, 1068 (1999) (arguing that campaign contributions and expenditures are not truly
voluntary).
47
See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 5, at 1373-75 (arguing that displaying preferences through contributions is
in many ways similar or even superior to displaying preferences through votes).
48
See Bauer, supra note 5, at 750-53 (discussing campaign finance and associative rights).
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speech, free association, and aggregative preferences presented by campaign finance
reform outweighs any benefits that such reform might produce. This implication takes
shape in the final, overarching objection of reform opponents: that there is no campaign
finance crisis, and that concerns about corruption, fairness, legitimacy, or autonomy are
overwrought, abstract, and largely unsubstantiated49 – in short, that the current volume of
money in campaigns presents no empirical problem sufficient to justify limits (or tighter
limits) on contributions or expenditures.50
With these competing arguments in mind, this paper considers bet-hedging and its
regulation only in the context of currently compelling governmental interests in
regulating campaign finance; that is, per Buckley and its progeny, the legitimate
restriction of campaign contributions in order to prevent corruption or the appearance
thereof.51 Therefore, while considerations of fairness and autonomy no doubt play a part
in a normative analysis of donors contributing to both sides at once, this paper raises
these concerns only tangentially,52 focusing instead on the degree to which such
contributions are suggestive of potentially corrupt ex post favor-seeking. And while the

49

Or, in the case of “appearance of corruption,” that it is the reformers themselves who are creating the
crisis of legitimacy – that appearance of corruption, absent corruption itself, is only a problem if it is
broadcast as such to the public at large. See, e.g., BCRA Debate, supra note 43 (statements of Sens.
Gramm and McConnell); Rich Lowry, The Campaign Finance Smear, National Review (February 12,
2000).
50
See Bauer, supra note 5, at 744-48 (arguing that the “corruption” argument for reform is not empirically
founded); Cain, supra note 42, at 114 (characterizing the question of whether or not contributions influence
the actions of legislators at all, let alone in such a manner as to constitute corruption, as a “lively topic of
dispute”).
51
See McConnell v. FEC, supra note 2, at 656 (reaffirming the government’s interests “in preventing both
the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the
electoral process through the appearance of corruption) (internal quotations omitted); FEC v. National
Conservative PAC, supra note 44, at 496-97 (noting that “preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption are the only legitimate and compelling governmental interests thus far identified for restricting
campaign finances”).
52
In fact, because this paper assumes the legitimacy of Buckley’s contribution limits, the goal of alleviating
politicians’ fundraising burdens may run counter to the direction of this analysis; the need to constantly
raise funds is arguably much greater in a world where the amount a single donor can give is capped.
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prospect of regulating hedged-bet contributions will be tested against the full suite of
arguments against reform, it is important to note that the prevention of corruption is a
baseline point with which almost every participant on either side of the campaign finance
debate agrees: that is, you will find virtually no argument that, as a general matter,
“corruption” should not be proscribed.
The trouble comes, of course, in defining what constitutes corruption and
pinpointing the ways in which it can be seen to occur – but here, again, both sides seem
to concur that bribery or other forms of explicit quid pro quo transactions, in which
money is given with the promise or reasonable expectation of a specific and personal
material gain, are verboten.53 Indeed, quid pro quo favor-seeking cuts directly against the
argument that campaign contributions are manifestations of democratic preference: if a
donor is giving money in exchange for anticipated services rendered, its stake in the
process is materially different than if it is merely picking the candidate or party that best
matches its preferences and attempting to maximize their chances of victory. And when
a donor contributes to competing parties or candidates, the likelihood that it is simply
manifesting its preferences as between democratic alternatives is vanishingly small: a
donor giving to both Bush and Kerry during the 2004 election could not have helped both
candidates win. That donor’s dual contribution makes sense only if a) it expected to gain
something from the eventual winner other than a generic advancement of mutual policy
53

But see Strauss, supra note 5, at 1372-73 (arguing that even direct quid pro quo campaign contributions
are, in themselves, neither inherently corrupt nor inherently objectionable). It should be noted that bribery
qua bribery is illegal under the relevant statutes regardless of campaign finance law. The difficulty in
defining corruption occurs in more ambiguous transactions, whereby campaign contributions are traded for
access or influence rather than outright promises that a legislator will vote a certain way on a certain bill.
And contributions-for-access, even on a quid pro quo basis, arguably present no legal problem. See Ian
Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for
Political Influence, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 837, 844 at n.21 (quoting then-Attorney General Janet Reno). The
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goals, and b) rather than trying to effect a particular outcome to the election, it simply
wished to ensure that it would have backed the winner, whoever that turned out to be.
This paper, then, presents a very simple thesis: contributions made by one donor
either to both parties in a given election cycle or to two candidates competing for the
same office carry with them a uniquely strong prima facie implication of ex post favorseeking. Furthermore, to the degree that such contributions are made in order to hedge
the donor’s bets (rather than other possible strategic reasons, explored in Parts III and
IV), they may not be justified through the invocation of democratic preferences. Finally,
because donations made in order to secure ex post benefits implicate concerns of
corruption and undue influence, hedged-bet behavior can and perhaps should be regulated
under the Buckley framework.

III. The Prevalence of Bet-Hedging
Before reaching the question of whether donors who give money to both parties
or to competing candidates within an election cycle are doing so in order to hedge their
bets (discussed in Part IV) or whether such behavior is normatively undesirable and may
constitutionally be regulated (discussed in Part V), it is first necessary to establish an
empirical foundation for the existence of hedged-bet donations – that is, how common is
this kind of behavior?
That contributions to competing candidates or competing parties do occur is
beyond dispute. It is commonplace to open the newspaper at any point in the election

problem of separating access from influence in the context of the regulation of bet-hedging is discussed in
Parts IV and V, infra.
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cycle and see accounts of donations being split in races for the presidency,54 the Senate,55
the House,56 state legislatures,57 governorships,58 lieutenant governorships,59 state
treasurer,60 county commissioner,61 and the mayor’s office.62 Donations are split to
national conventions,63 to party committees64 and to competing candidates,65 in general

54

See, e.g., Richard S. Dunham & Susan Straight, More Corporate Chiefs Are Hedging Their Bets,
BUSINESS WEEK, March 6, 2000, at 42 (“[M]any pragmatic CEOs want an open door at the White House
whichever candidate emerges victorious.”).
55
See, e.g., Sean Cockerham, Alaska business community supports Hawaii incumbent, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, October 29, 2004, at A1 (donor giving money to Alaska senator Lisa Murkowski and her
Democratic challenger).
56
See, e.g., Susan B. Glasser & Juliet Eilperin, GOP Scrambles to Counter Business’s Aid to Democrats;
‘Bet Hedging’ Evens Campaign Committee Gifts, WASHINGTON POST, November 10, 1999, at A6 (quoting
lobbyist saying, “The prevailing mood downtown is: This could go either way. We better make sure our
interests are protected no matter who’s in control.”)
57
See, e.g., Peter Baker, Va. Companies Paying to Win in Election; Large Firms Give Similar Amounts to
Both Sides in Battle for Legislature, WASHINGTON POST, October 31, 1995, at C1 (firms donating to both
parties in state legislature race).
58
See, e.g., Keith Griffin, Firm Leaders Hedge Their Political Bets; Some managing partners cover their
bases. For others, it’s all or nothing, CONNECTICUT LAW TRIBUNE, November 1, 2004, at 1 (donating to
multiple candidates in Connecticut gubernatorial race).
59
See, e.g., B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Giving to Both Sides Is Seen as a Safe Bet, NEW YORK TIMES, April
6, 1998, at A16 (In race for Texas Lieutenant Governor, “some $300,000 of the $4.5 million had come
from a hundred or so wealthy individuals and political action committees that hedged their bets and gave
equally to each candidate.”).
60
See, e.g., Matthew Frank, In Treasurer’s Race, Any Edge Helps, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 28,
2004 (banking industry giving to candidates in both parties).
61
See, e.g., Jason Garcia, Donors Spread Wealth Between Rival Camps, ORLANDO SENTINEL, October 8,
2004, at B1 (bet-hedging in Florida county commissioner race).
62
See, e.g., Matt Carter, Campaigns raise more than $105,000, TRI-VALLEY HERALD (PLEASANTON, CA.),
November 1, 2004 (bet-hedging in local mayoral race); Eric Lipton, Hevesi Leads in Money From, and
Returned To, Intermediaries, NEW YORK TIMES, July 19, 2001, at B1 (“[T]he city’s real estate industry is,
as planned, hedging its bets in the mayor’s race by spreading dollars among the candidates…”).
63
See, e.g., Slackman, supra note 26, at A1; “Executive Excess 2004: Campaign Contributions,
Outsourcing, Unexpensed Stock Options and Rising CEO Pay,” available at
http://www.faireconomy.org/press/2004/EE2004.pdf, at 13 (“Of the 69 convention sponsors, 29 supported
the [2004] Democratic convention only, 24 sponsored the [2004] Republican convention only, and 16
companies chose to hedge their bets by sponsoring both conventions.”).
64
See, e.g., Chris Mulick, Kennewick, Wash.-area campaign donations are triple the amount from 2000,
TRI-CITY HERALD, October 31, 2004 (Washington State companies giving to both parties); Ruth Marcus &
Charles R. Babcock, Parties’ National Committees Set Records for ‘Soft Money’; Much Is Used for Ads
Indirectly Promoting Candidates, WASHINGTON POST, July 18, 1996, at A8 (“And some companies hedged
their bets. Anheuser-Busch Inc. gave $100,000 each to the DNC and RNC, as did Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons…. MCI Gave $140,000 to Republicans and $100,000 to Democrats.”).
65
See, e.g., Eric Krol, Some Donors Hedging Bets in Pursuit of Political Clout, THE DAILY HERALD,
September 1, 2002, available at http://www.ilcampaign.org/news/somedonors9-1-02.html (donor giving
$25,000 to each gubernatorial candidate).
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elections66 and in primaries.67 They come from lobbyists,68 lawyers,69 CEOs,70 industry
PACs,71 casinos,72 sports team owners,73 and horse breeders,74 in campaigns in New
York,75 Washington, D.C.,76 Virginia,77 Illinois,78 Florida,79 and elsewhere.80 Moreover,

66

See, e.g., Adam Clymer, House Democrats Have Money Edge on GOP, NEW YORK TIMES, June 11,
2000, at A30 (“[Donors] know it will take a net gain of only six Democratic seats to install Democrats in
House positions of power, so they are giving to both sides.”).
67
See, e.g., GOP Donors Not Playing Favorites, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, September 21, 1995, at 14 (wire
service report) (donors giving to multiple GOP presidential candidates).
68
See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lobbyists Spread Campaign Cash; Bush, Kerry Have Benefited Since ’97,
THE WASHINGTON POST, May 6, 2004, at A8 (“Several lobbyists and lobbying firms were careful to hedge
their bets and donate to both candidates.”); Don Van Natta, Jr., Lobbyists are a Lode for the Leading
Presidential Campaigns, NEW YORK TIMES, June 22, 1999, at A21 (“Most major lobbying firms have
hedged their bets by having partners raise money for different candidates. That way, no matter who wins,
the firms will have helped the winner.”).
69
See, e.g., Saundra Torry, For Both Political Parties, the Bar Tab is Generous, WASHINGTON POST,
August 19, 1996, at F7 (law firms giving to both national party committees).
70
See, e.g., Richard S. Dunham & Fred Jesperson, Who the Corporate Bosses Are Backing, BUSINESS
WEEK, November 15, 1999, at 112 (citing 52 of 389 business executives as giving money to presidential
candidates from both parties in the 2000 campaign).
71
See, e.g., Amy Keller, PACs Hedge Their Bets, ROLL CALL, September 25, 2000 (“With control of
Congress up for grabs and many House and Senate races too close to call this campaign season, hundreds
of political action committees are hedging their bets and contributing to both candidates engaged in
especially tight election contests.”).
72
See, e.g., Nevada’s Senate Race: Hoist the Ensign, THE ECONOMIST, October 28, 2000 (casinos giving to
competing Nevada senatorial candidates); see also Samantha Young, Thousands in Nevada play political
money game, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, October 31, 2004, at 1B (gaming and casino executives
donating to both Bush and Kerry).
73
See, e.g., Greg Andrews, Biz cash fueling election; With race tight, stakes high, executives write huge
checks, INDIANAPOLIS BUSINESS JOURNAL, October 25, 2004, at 1A (Indianapolis Colts owner Jim Irsay
contributing $22,500 to each Indiana gubernatorial candidate); Michael Janofsky,Political Points , THE
NEW YORK TIMES, August 31, 2003, at 26 (Carl Lindner, owner of the Cincinnati Reds, personally
contributes “substantial amounts to both parties, about two-thirds to Republicans and the rest to
Democrats.”).
74
See, e.g., Scott Wilson, Margot Williams, & Bridget Roeber, Industrial-Strength Money; Special
Interests Follow Md. Candidates’ Policies, WASHINGTON POST, October 18, 1998, at A1 (in Maryland
gubernatorial race, “[b]ankers, doctors, developers, and horse breeders in particular have essentially hedged
the early bets they placed on the governor out of fear they may prove useless if he loses reelection.”).
75
See, e.g., Stefan C. Friedman, Real Estate Bigs Spread the Wealth in Mayor Race, THE NEW YORK POST,
January 23, 2005, at 13 (detailing a real estate developer’s contribution of the maximum amount allowable
under the law to every New York City mayoral candidate but one);
76
See, e.g., Yolanda Woodlee, Chavous Trails Evans in Donations; Both Get Big Sums From Outside City,
WASHINGTON POST, March 19, 1998, at J1 (donor contributing to multiple D.C. mayoral candidates).
77
See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Dan Eggen, Va. Candidates Play to High-Tech Voters, WASHINGTON
POST, September 17, 2000, at C1 (MCI WorldCom giving $3,000 to competing Senate candidates).
78
See, e.g., Mike Royko, A Lesson in How to Build a War Chest, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, December 13, 1988,
at 3 (donors contributing to multiple Chicago mayoral candidates, because “[t]here are thousands of people
who wish to be on good terms with the mayor of Chicago, regardless of who he is.”).
79
See, e.g., John Kennedy, Money race for ’06 heats up, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 17, 2005, at B1 (donors
giving money to both Republican gubernatorial candidates in Florida).
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commentators, including the Supreme Court,81 seem to believe that such behavior is both
frequent and wide-ranging within our political system,82 and that it is indicative of a
desire to guarantee the receipt of ex post benefits.83
Analytically, however, such anecdotal evidence is not ideal. In order to make the
case that bet-hedging deserves greater regulatory attention – and, per Part IV, infra, that
bet-hedging donors are “seeking influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting
any particular ideology”84 – it would be nice to demonstrate empirically that the practice
is habitual among large donors. The most comprehensive available data, collected by the
Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), tell us that most top federal donors give money to
both Democrats and Republicans.85 Of the top 100 donors in the seven election cycles
from 1989 to 2002, for example, 79 split their contributions at least 90%-10% between
the two parties.86 During the 2003-2004 election cycle, the most recent cycle for which
complete data are collected on national elections, this breakdown is true for 78 of the top
80

See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 53, at A16 (Texas lieutenant governor race); THE ECONOMIST, supra note 72
(Nevada Senate race); Sean Wolfe, Election 2002: Contributors Hedge Their Bets, ASHLAND DAILY
TIDINGS, May 11, 2002, available at http://dailytidings.com/2002/news0511/headline/dt_news-02.php
(double giving to party committees in Oregon).
81
124 S. Ct. at 663.
82
See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, Common Cause Lists ‘Soft’ Donors, WASHINGTON POST, March 13, 1998, at A23
(“As always, a number of companies hedged their bets and contributed generously to both sides. Ten gave
$100,000 or more to both parties last year…”); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 13, at 1714 (describing
bet-hedging as a “propensity of many institutional actors”). But see Kathleen Gallagher, Executives get just
one vote each, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, September 5, 2004, at 1D (“Charles Franklin, a political
science professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, says [double giving is] more anecdote than
truth. He says he analyzed election data from 1990 through 1996 and found that only 0.7% of all
contributors gave to both candidates in the same race.”).
83
See, e.g., 124 S. Ct. at 663.
84
Id.
85
The Center for Reponsive Politics, Blue Chip Investors: The Top 100 Donors to Federal Elections, 19892002, “The Top 100 Donors,” available at http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/toporgs/topdonors.asp (last
visited August 14, 2005) [hereinafter “Top Donors 1989-2002]; The Center for Responsive Politics, Blue
Chip Investors: The Top 100 Donors to Federal Elections, “Appendix: Contributions by the Top 100
Donors in 2001-2002,” available at http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/toporgs/appendix.asp (last visited
August 14, 2005) [hereinafter “Top Donors 2001-2002”]; The Center for Responsive Politics, “2004
Election Overview: Top Overall Donors,” at http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topcontribs.asp?
cycle=2004 (last visited August 14, 2005) [hereinafter “Top Donors 2003-2004”].
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100 donors.87 Interestingly, at the federal level only institutional donors (such as
corporate PACs and trade organizations) appear to split their donations; individuals are
remarkably consistent along party lines.88 During the 2003-2004 election cycle, for
instance, only 43 of the top 100 donors split their contributions between the Democratic
and Republican parties.89 Of those forty-three, thirty-nine gave one party ten percent or
less of their contribution total.90 Bet-hedging behavior by individual donors appears
slightly more common in state and local races,91 for reasons that are further explored in
Part IV.A.
Although most discussions of split donations assume that cross-party
contributions are, by themselves, evidence that donors are hedging their bets,92 that
assumption is insufficient for the purposes of this paper. To support an inference that
donors are covering their bases to ensure ex post benefits from the eventual winner, it is
not enough to show that a donor’s contributions are not confined to a single party. Bethedging, in which ex post favor-seeking is the most likely explanation for a donor’s
behavior, must be distinguished from mere donation-splitting, in which there are other,
more benign reasons that a donor might be giving money across party lines.
If it is a reasonable inference of ex post benefits that separates bet-hedging from
donation-splitting, what specific behavior characterizes the former but not the latter? The

86

Top Donors 1989-2002, supra note 85.
Top Donors 2003-2004, supra note 85.
88
The Center for Responsive Politics, “2004 Election Overview: Top Individual Contributors,” available
at http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topindivs.asp?cycle=2004 (last visited August 14, 2005)
[hereinafter “Top Individual Donors 2003-2004”].
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
See, e.g., Wilson, Williams, & Roeber, supra note 74; Carter, supra note 62; Royko, supra note 78.
92
See, e.g., Mike Allen, Democrats Gain as Business Hedges Bets; House Campaign Arm Leads GOP in
Money, WASHINGTON POST, October 17, 2000, at A11 (characterizing increased business donations to
Democrats as bet-hedging).
87
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strongest presumption of ex post favor-seeking occurs when a donor’s contribution
cannot be explained as a demonstration of its preference for one party or candidate over
competing alternatives. Donations to competing candidates or parties are therefore
inherently more suspect than a donation to a single candidate or party. As noted above,
when Donor Z gives money to competing candidates Mr. Dem and Mrs. Gop, Donor Z is
not expressing a preference for one over the other; the likelihood is high that Donor Z
would not give to both sides if it did not expect something from the winner after the
election, whoever the winner might be.
The gold standard example of bet-hedging, then, is an instance in which a donor
gives to candidates competing for the same office. In his article on the 2002 Illinois
gubernatorial race, Eric Krol notes that “[a]t least 102 contributors have given cash to
both [Democratic candidate] Rod Blagojevich and [Republican candidate] Jim Ryan in
the past year.”93 Similarly, in the 2000 Virginia Senate race, MCI WorldCom donated
$3,000 each to competitors Charles Robb and George Allen.94 And in the 2004 election
cycle, investment firm Goldman Sachs contributed over $290,000 to John Kerry’s
presidential campaign and almost $390,000 to the reelection efforts of President Bush.95
Morgan Stanley, UBS Americas, Citigroup, Bank of America, Microsoft, and JP Morgan
Chase & Co are also among the top twenty contributors to each of the major party
presidential nominees for 2004.96 Further examples abound.97
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Krol, supra note 65.
Shear & Eggen, supra note 77, at C1.
95
The Center for Responsive Politics, “John Kerry: Top Contributors,” at
http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/contrib.asp?id=N00000245&cycle=2004 (last visited August 14,
2005) [hereinafter “Kerry Donors 2004”]; The Center for Responsive Politics, “George W. Bush: Top
Contributors,” at http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/contrib.asp?id=N00008072&cycle=2004 (last
visited August 14, 2005) [hereinafter “Bush Donors 2004”].
96
Id.
97
See, e.g., Keller, supra note 71 (PACs giving to competing candidates in numerous Congressional races).
94

21

These are cases where the outcome is zero-sum; either one candidate wins, or the
other does. Therefore, it is economically irrational for a donor to give to both sides
unless it is maximizing its chances of an ex post benefit – that is, unless it believes that
giving to both candidates will result in a more favorable ex post position than trying to
help one candidate beat the other.
A presumption of ex post favor-seeking may also be made when a contributor
makes soft money donations to competing party committees within a single election
cycle. Again, because these donations are ostensibly reserved for “party-building,” they
do not raise the same concerns of undue influence as do contributions to individual
candidates. But “party-building,” too, is essentially zero-sum: one party’s share of
political power must necessarily increase or decrease relative to other parties. Giving
money to two competing party committees makes little sense, unless, in the words of a
GOP lobbyist, the donor is trying to “make sure [its] interests are protected no matter
who’s in control.”98 In that way, then, Anheuser-Busch’s donations of $100,000 each to
the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Republican National Committee
(RNC) in the 1995-96 election cycle99 strongly suggest an expectation of ex post benefits
(there is one circumstance in which donations to competing party committees is not
suggestive of ex post favor-seeking; this circumstance is dealt with later in the Part).
To summarize: if a donor gives money to sources in multiple parties or, in the
case of party primaries, to multiple candidates within the same party, it is engaging in
donation-splitting. Donations that are split between competing candidates or competing
party organizations within the same election cycle, because they carry with them an

98
99

Glasser & Eilperin, supra note 56, at A6.
Marcus & Babcock, supra note 64, at A8.
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inference of ex post expectations, constitute the most suspect form of donation-splitting,
here termed bet-hedging. By contrast, other forms of donation-splitting – for example,
giving to non-competing candidates of different parties,100 or giving to the national
committee of one party and candidates of another party – do not necessarily suggest ex
post favor-seeking,101 and should thus be distinguished from bet-hedging in this analysis.
Unfortunately, the CRP data do not make this distinction, and it is therefore difficult to
make a precise empirical determination regarding the prevalence of bet-hedging.
The remainder of this part is devoted, first, to detailing the ways in which a
contributor might split its donations without crossing the threshold into presumptive bethedging and, second, to examining how the CRP data might be interpreted in light of the
donation-splitting/bet-hedging distinction. While a discussion of donation-splitting
necessarily touches upon issues of donor motivation, this part does not seek to determine
what donors hope to gain by hedging their bets, nor how donors decide to apportion their
split donations. These issues are explored at length in Part IV.
A. Donation-Splitting
Let’s return to Donor Z. Assume that all we know of Donor Z’s contribution
history is that, over the last eight full election cycles (1989-2004), it has given a total of
$2 million to Democrats and $2 million to Republicans. Having given equally to both
major parties, Donor Z is certainly donation-splitting; why can we not also presume that
it is hedging its bets?

100

See, e.g., Mike Madden, Daschle gets some GOP money, ARGUS LEADER (SIOUX FALLS, SD), October
14, 2004, at 5A (Some top Bush donors gave to Daschle’s Senate campaign, but “[n]one of the four
Rangers and Pioneers who donated to Daschle has contributed to [Daschle challenger John] Thune’s Senate
race, federal records show.”).
101
Or, at least, do not do so to any greater degree than campaign contributions generally.
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There are a number of answers to this question. First, these cumulative totals
leave open the possibility that Donor Z is not giving to both parties simultaneously, but
rather switching from one to the other (either on an election-by- election basis or,
alternatively, gradually and permanently over the course of cycles). That is, Donor Z’s
equal split of contributions between the two parties since 1989 says nothing about
potential bet-hedging if the donor gave 100 percent of its donation monies to the
Democrats half the time and 100 percent to the Republicans the other half. This sort of
behavior makes little sense for donors like the American Trial Lawyers Association
(ATLA) or the National Rifle Association (NRA) whose ideologies consistently and
disproportionately dovetail towards one party, but might be a rational donation strategy
for pragmatic donors wishing to send the entirety of their contribution to the single party
perceived to be in power in a given election cycle.
Of course, it must be pointed out that such pragmatism itself is in all probability
unjustifiable under the democratic preferences rationale for campaign contributions. If a
donor gives all its money to one party this election cycle and to another party the next,
it’s much more likely that the donor is using its money to gain favorable ex post policy
outcomes for itself than that its policy preferences and interests (or those of the two
parties) have undergone such a rapid shift. Insofar as ex post favor-seeking is our
concern, then, a donor’s decision to give to the party in power is no less suspect than its
decision to give to both parties in order to have given to the party in power (although it is
a good deal more uncertain).
However, the alternative explanation listed above carries more weight. If Donor
Z is not switching donations election by election, but instead has migrated from one party
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to the other over the course of time, then those donations would be no more suggestive of
ex post expectations than any other ordinary campaign contribution. That is, it’s
perfectly plausible that a donor’s policy preferences can change over time, even to the
degree that it finds its interests more fully advanced by a different party in 2004 than in
1989.102
In fact, FedEx Corp provides a real-life example of this kind of gradual shift in
preference. From 1989-2004, FedEx gave 57 percent of its total contributions to the
Republican Party, with 43 percent going to the Democrats.103 But the total amount
donated by FedEx has more than doubled over this period of time, while the amount
given to the Democrats stayed roughly the same until 2000, where it began a precipitous
decline.104 As a result of this, FedEx’s giving has shifted dramatically from the
Democrats to the Republicans. While FedEx has given at least 40 percent to each party
in aggregate over the last eight full election cycles, in only one of those cycles was
giving to each so balanced as to actually exceed 40 percent.105 FedEx’s giving history
looks like this:106
Election Cycle
1989-90
1991-92
1993-94
1995-96
1997-98
1999-2000
2001-02

Percent Given to Each Party
64-36, Democrats
64-36, Democrats
72-28, Democrats
58-42, Republicans
72-28, Republicans
65-35, Republicans
70-30, Republicans

102

This would, again, be less true of donors whose ideology – and, by extension, party identification – are
well-defined and fairly fixed in place. No union, for example, is very likely to be giving the bulk of its
money to the Republicans in the near future.
103
The Center for Responsive Politics, Top All-Time Donors, “FedEx Corp,” available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.asp?ID=D000000089 [hereinafter “FedEx Corp”].
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. Through July 2004, FedEx’s contributions in the 2003-2004 election cycle are weighted 69-31 to the
Republicans. See Top Donors 2003-2004, supra note 85.
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2003-04

68-32, Republicans

Notwithstanding that it still donated a substantial portion of its money to each party each
cycle (an issue dealt with in Parts IIIB and IV), the shift in FedEx’s giving is perfectly
consistent with a legitimate democratic preference of one party over alternatives; there is
no need to infer ex post favor-seeking in order to find a rational explanation for its
behavior. In fact, because the CRP data tell us only how much money FedEx contributed
to all Republicans and all Democrats during each of these cycles, the likeliest and
simplest explanation for the contribution shift is that, since the 1994 Republican
Revolution, there have been more Republicans in Congress than Democrats. If FedEx
contributes largely to incumbents, one would expect its donation pattern to reflect the
change in party control of the House and Senate.107
It should be clear, then, that a donor’s cumulative giving history over several
election cycles does not provide enough information to conclude anything more than that
it has split its donations. If what we know of Donor Z is that it gave equally to both
parties from the period 1989-2002, we cannot tell whether or not it has hedged its bets;
that is, per the definition of bet-hedging, whether or not it has given to competing
candidates or to competing party organizations during the same election cycle.
Does it make matters easier if we know Donor Z’s donations to each side within a
single election cycle? Yes, but not much. Let’s say we know that, from 2001-2002,
Donor Z contributed $100,000 to Democrats and $100,000 to Republicans. There are

107

See The Center for Responsive Politics, Blue Chip Investors: The Top 100 Donors to Federal Elections,
1989-2002, “Shifting Strategies Over the Years,” available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/toporgs/strats.asp [hereinafter “Shifting Strategies”] (“contributions to
Republican candidates jumped significantly after the GOP takeover of Congress in the 1994 elections”).
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several ways in which this giving split might be explained without resort to an inference
of constitutionally dubious ex post favor-seeking.
First, it may be that Donor Z has given money to different candidates in different
races. If Donor Z chooses which candidate it will support in each race on the basis of
each candidate’s ability to advance Donor Z’s interests if elected, and pays little attention
to party affiliation, it might easily end up giving to Democratic candidates in certain races
and Republican candidates in others. There’s nothing inherently objectionable about this;
as Ameritech vice-president Gary Lytle commented in 1999, “We normally give to
people who support our positions. That includes people on both sides of the aisle.”108
Many donors have interests that cannot be comfortably pigeonholed as “Democrat” or
“Republican,” but rather span the parties; that they would give to noncompeting
candidates of different parties should raise no ex post warning flags.109
Similarly, Donor Z might give to the national committee of one party and
individual candidates of the other party. Depending on ideological variances within
parties, a donor’s policy interests might be better served by the election of candidates
from different parties in different districts, depending on the candidate and on the district,
even if it normally gives to only one party. For example, finance company MBNA might
give some of its money to particular Democratic candidates in an election cycle because
those candidates happen to have stronger positions – or, if elected, are likely to have
greater influence – on particular important issues, such as bankruptcy reform or banking
deregulation, than do their Republican opponents. This doesn’t change the fact that, in
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the main, Republican candidates (and the Republican Party overall) will be most likely to
reflect MBNA’s preferences and thus will receive the overwhelming bulk of MBNA’s
money.110
Moreover, the timing of donations often plays a crucial role in supporting an
inference of ex post expectations. There is evidence that some donors who split
donations do so at different stages of the campaign – they will give to one candidate or
party at first, and if it appears that others to whom they have not donated are doing better
than expected, will shift donations later in the game in order to cover their bases. This
seems especially likely to occur at the end of the campaign, when close races cause late
flurries of giving as one side finally pulls ahead,111 but may in fact happen any time an
underdog candidate becomes a serious contender. For example, many CEOs, having
already donated to presidential candidates Bill Bradley, George W. Bush, and Al Gore
the year before, waited until the early spring of 2000, when it became clear that John
McCain would challenge for the Republican nomination, before sending checks his way
as well.112 Conversely, donors could spread their money around if it appears that the
initial target of their contribution is doing worse than expected; witness the 1998
Maryland gubernatorial race, in which “[b]ankers, doctors, developers, and horse
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breeders…essentially hedged the early bets they placed on the governor out of fear they
may prove useless if he loses reelection.”113
What does timing tell us about the donor’s likelihood of ex post favor-seeking?
Donations that are further apart in time are more plausibly motivated by innocuous
donation-splitting than donations that are close together. If Donor Z, having contributed
$5,000 to each candidate in a Senate race, discloses that the contributions happened
within days of each other, it is extremely likely that Donor Z is seeking ex post benefits
from the winner of the election. There are few alternative explanations for nearsimultaneous giving to competing candidates.114 If, however, the first $5,000 donation
was made in February and the second in early November, it is difficult to say whether
Donor Z is hedging its bets. It may be that the recipient of the second donation emerged
as a strong enough candidate down the stretch that Donor Z felt justified in covering its
bets by giving them money. By contrast, it may be that, over the course of the campaign,
the recipient of the first donation espoused policy goals that caused Donor Z to reorder its
preferences and to attempt to maximize the second candidate’s chances of winning; here
there can be no special ex post inference to be made at all.115 Alternately, Donor Z’s first
choice may prove a weaker candidate than expected, prompting the donor to shift
resources to a candidate who, while preferentially second-best, is more likely to win.
This is an especially likely scenario in races with three or more candidates,116 or where
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the donor has contributed money during the party primaries, and is now choosing
between a pared-down set of candidates.117 And, of course, it may simply be that one
candidate entered the race later than the other, and Donor Z’s policies and preferences
align better with those of the late entry.118
Party primaries engender another circumstance in which donation-splitting by
Donor Z might not rise to the level of bet-hedging. Consider this: a Business Week study
in November 1999 found that 52 of 389 executives surveyed had already contributed
money to presidential candidates in both parties.119 On the face of it, those executives are
clearly hedging their bets; donations to competing candidates, after all, leave no
reasonable inference but that the donor seeks ex post benefits. At this point in the
process, however, candidates in different parties are not yet truly competing; until the
primaries have been held, candidates jockey with those in their own party for votes and
dollars. Before the primaries, then, it’s entirely possible for rational donors with ordered
sets of preferences to use their contributions strategically in order to advance the
prospects of candidates in each party while implicating bet-hedging only in an abstract,
generalized manner.
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This could manifest itself in one of two ways:
1) Candidates A and B are competing for the Democratic nomination, and
Candidates C and D are competing for the Republican nomination. The donor strongly
prefers Candidate A to all other candidates, and gauges that, of Candidate A’s possible
opponents in the general election, Candidate D is demonstrably the weaker. The donor
might therefore contribute money to both Candidate A and Candidate D, with the intent
of pitting its preferred candidate against a weaker opponent after the primaries.
2) As before, Candidates A and B are competing for the Democratic nomination,
and Candidates C and D are competing for the Republican nomination. Of the
Democratic candidates, the donor strongly prefers A; of the Republican candidates, the
donor strongly prefers C. The donor then gives money to each of his preferred candidates
in the hopes that they win their respective primaries. If they do, and the donor is
indifferent as between them, it need not contribute any more; it has effected an outcome
in which a candidate favorable to its interests will win the election. If the donor prefers
one over the other – say, Candidate A over Candidate C – it can then give further money
to Candidate A in the hopes of advancing his electoral prospects (but with the knowledge
that, should A fail, C is tolerable as well). In neither of these strategies does the donor do
anything but demonstrate its democratic preference for one candidate over another;
therefore, they cannot be considered bet-hedging per se, and there exists no particular
suggestion of ex post expectation (again, no more so than for any campaign contribution).
This paper contends that only when a donor gives to competing candidates, or to
competing parties within a single election cycle, can you be reasonably certain that ex
post benefits are expected. There are two circumstances, however, in which even
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donations to competing candidates or parties might possibly be justified without resort to
an ex post inference. Let me close this section by offering and discarding these situations
as being viable explanations for widespread donor behavior.
First, donations to competing candidates – even if the second takes place soon
after the first – might be explained by invoking the democratic preferences rationale if, as
happened in the 2002 New Jersey Senate race, a candidate drops out and is replaced at
the last minute by someone else.120 In that case, a donor who had given to the nowdeposed candidate could reassess its preferences, decide that the original opponent was
more likely to advance its policy interests than the replacement candidate, and transfer its
support.
Alternately, a donor may find itself giving to competing sides if a candidate who
has dropped out of a race decides to re-enter. The 2004 Indiana gubernatorial contest, for
example, saw Democrat Joe Kernan regarded as his party’s presumptive nominee in
2001,121 withdrawing his name from consideration in December 2002,122 and changing
his mind and deciding to run in November 2003.123 As a result, some donors, like
Indianapolis businessman James Zink, found themselves backing both Kernan and his
Republican opponent Mitch Daniels.124 Zink, who had contributed $9,000 to Kernan in
2001-02, developed a donor relationship with Daniels after Kern dropped out of the
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race.125 When Kern became a candidate again, Zink resupported him.126 Zink gave a
total of $25,000 to Daniels and $20,000 to Kernan in 2003.127
In situations like these, donation-splitting behavior may legitimately be explained
without the need to infer untoward motivations on the part of donors. Such behavior,
however legitimate, might potentially be deterred by a regulatory response prohibiting
donations to competing candidates (see Part V). However, it must be noted that such
scenarios are extremely rare, and exceptions to bet-hedging regulation covering this
contingency could easily be crafted.
B. Interpreting the Data
We turn now to the CRP data detailing the giving practices of the top 100 donors
from the 1989-2002 election cycles and the 2003-2004 election cycle. Because the data
do not distinguish bet- hedging from the other forms of donation-splitting discussed
above, they should be viewed as an imperfect measure of the prevalence of donor bethedging. With that caveat in mind, it should nevertheless be possible to gain a sense of
the scope of hedged-bet behavior.
Let’s look first at the giving splits of the top 100 donors cumulatively over this
period. As mentioned, 79 of the top donors from 1989 to 2002 split their contributions at
least 90%-10% between the Democrats and Republicans.128 The NRA, for example, gave
18 percent of its donations over this time to the Democrats and 82 percent to the
Republicans, while ATLA gave 88 percent to the Democrats and 12 percent to the
Republicans.
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It is interesting that even stringently ideological groups such as these have given
thousands and thousands of dollars to the party to whom they are presumably opposed.
While some of this might be explained by the targeting of favorable individual crossparty candidates (as discussed supra), it’s still likely that both the NRA and the ATLA
have engaged in bet-hedging to some degree. Practically speaking, any non-zero amount
given to competing candidates or party committees appears to strain the democratic
preferences argument and raise questions of possible bet-hedging. Whether more
extreme splits in donations indicate a smaller likelihood that the donor is engaging in ex
post favor-seeking – whether, that is, the United Auto Workers giving 1 percent of its
total contribution to the Republicans is less indicative of bet-hedging than Citigroup, Inc.
giving 47 percent to one and 53 percent to the other,129 since UAW is presumably tied
ideologically to the Democrats far more than is Citigroup – is a question raised in Part
IV. Because the likelihood of bet-hedging is more stark where contributions to both sides
are equal or nearly equal, this section focuses on instances where a donor indicates no
strong preference for giving its money to one party over the other.
To that end, the CRP data also show that 34 of the top 100 donors over these
seven election cycles gave at least 40 percent of their total contribution to each party.130
This roster includes giants from the telecommunications, banking, technology, trade, and
insurance sectors, among others.131 The full slate of 34 top donors who, since the 1989
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election cycle, have cumulatively given at least 40 percent of their donations to each
major party is as follows (in order of their appearance on the Top 100 Donors list):132
Top Donors Giving At Least 40 Percent to Each Party, 1989-2002
Name (Rank)

Split

Party receiving majority

Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors (3)
American Medical Ass’n (8)
AT&T (12)
Citigroup, Inc. (18)
American Bankers Ass’n (27)
FedEx Corp (28)
BellSouth Corp. (29)
SBC Communications (30)
Ernst & Young (34)
Lockheed Martin (35)
JP Morgan Chase & Co. (36)
Nat’l Ass’n of Insur. & Financial Adv. (38)
American Institute of CPAs (39)
Microsoft Corp (40)
American Dental Ass’n (42)
Bank of America (45)
American Hospital Ass’n (46)
General Electric (50)
Morgan Stanley (51)
AFLAC, Inc. (52)
Credit Union Nat’l Ass’n (59)
WorldCom, Inc. (64)
Boeing Co. (65)
Prudential Financial (68)
Freddie Mac (69)
Archer Daniels Midland (75)
Anheuser-Busch (78)
American Int’l Group (80)

53-47
59-41
54-46
53-47
58-42
57-43
54-47
56-44
53-46
58-42
59-41
57-43
56-45
57-43
53-47
54-46
54-46
52-48
57-43
55-46
52-48
54-46
57-43
53-47
59-41
57-43
50-50
54-46

Republican (R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
Democrat (D)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
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Nat’l Rural Electric Cooperative Ass’n (81)
American Academy of Ophthalmology (85)
General Dynamics (91)
American Airlines (93)
Metropolitan Life (96)
American Maritime Officers (97)

57-43
56-44
55-45
52-48
56-44
55-45

(D)
(D)
(R)
(R)
(D)
(R)

The CRP data, then, confirm at least initially the perception of many
commentators: that over the last seven election cycles from 1989 to 2002, top donors
have given millions of dollars to each party. This by itself is some evidence that these
donors are hedging their bets, as it’s fairly unlikely that all 34 donors underwent
philosophical shifts mid-decade causing them to switch their party allegiances. Bearing
in mind the possibility of gradual shifts, though, let’s see whether the data from the 20032004 cycle look any different:133
Top Donors Giving At Least 40 Percent to Each Party, 2003-04
Name (2003-04 Rank)

Split

Party receiving majority

National Ass’n of Realtors (2)
Morgan Stanley (5)
JP Morgan Chase & Co. (7)
Citigroup, Inc. (8)
Bank of America (10)
General Electric (21)
Credit Union National Ass’n (26)
American Hospital Ass’n (33)
Credit Suisse First Boston (36)
Cendant Corp (49)
American Dental Ass’n (53)
Boeing Co. (59)
Bear Stearns (63)
WPP Group (66)
National Rural Electric Coop. Ass’n (67)
BellSouth Corp (71)
General Dynamics (76)
Comcast Corp (84)

52-48
59-41
53-48
51-49
53-47
53-47
57-42
55-45
54-46
56-44
60-40
54-46
50-50
56-44
56-44
60-40
57-43
52-48

Republicans (R)
(R)
Democrats (D)
(D)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
(R)
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Anheuser-Busch (85)
Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Assn (90)
News Corp (97)

60-40 (R)
57-43 (R)
60-40 (D)

As this shows, 21 top donors have given at least 40 percent to each party in 200304, compared with 34 from 1989-2002.134 The data demonstrate that top donors have
essentially mirrored their aggregate giving practices on a cycle-by- cycle basis over the
past fourteen years.135 Anheuser-Busch, for example, has given no less than 34 percent
of its donations to each major party in every election cycle, although its contribution
trend is toward more money to the Republicans and less to the Democrats – a 66-34 split
in favor of the Democrats in 1989-90, 51-49 in favor of the Republicans for Election
2000, and 60-40 in favor of the Republicans so far in 2003-04.136 Most of the donors
listed above follow this same trend, shifting the bulk of their money from the Democrats
to the Republicans while hovering near the 40 percent threshold every cycle for each
party.
As mentioned earlier, this overall shift of monies to the Republican Party is most
likely largely attributable to control of Congress changing hands in the mid-1990s.137
However, to the degree that these contributions are made to the national party committee
rather than individual candidates, this shift in donations might also signal changes in
fundraising strategy between the two parties or, indeed, changing party policies such that
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these donors – while still motivated to give to both parties – feel their interests better
represented by the Republicans. Additionally, although the sample size is small, it’s
notable that the 2003-04 election cycle seems to have brought about a relative resurgence
in top donors giving more to the Democrats than to the Republicans. Of those donors
who have given at least 40 percent to each party, 5 of 21 in 2003-04 made the bulk of
their contributions to the Democrats, compared with only 2 of 24 in 2001-02.138 This
might be explained by the inherent lability of the top donors list; donors crack the top 100
one cycle and miss it the next, but their own donation practices stay relatively stable.
Nevertheless, some organizations appear to have broken into the top 100 list in this cycle
only because they have ramped up their giving to the Democrats, both as an absolute and
a proportional matter. Law firm Akin Gump Strauss gave 84 percent of its $240,000 in
soft money campaign contributions to the Republicans in 1999-2000.139 In the 2002
election cycle, the firm contributed 65 percent of its $218,000 in soft money to the
Republicans.140 And in the 2004 election cycle Akin Gump gave 63 percent of its $1.2
million in contributions to the Democrats.141
Furthermore, while top donors have shifted their contributions, proportionally,
from Democrats to Republicans over the past decade, there is evidence that Democrats
have made up ground in general with bet-hedging business donors.142 This has become
enough of an issue in recent years that the Republicans, in response to the Democratic
threat, have taken measures to divert the flow of dollars. For example, the Republican
138
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National Campaign Committee instituted the “75 Percent Club” explicitly to counter bethedging by business; the club gives “special access to political action committees that
give at least [75 percent] of their donations to GOP candidates.”143
It’s also interesting to observe that those donors who split their contributions most
evenly between the major parties typically are not clumped at the top of the donor lists
for each election cycle, but rather are scattered throughout the top 100 donors. For the
2003-2004 election cycle, for example, eleven of the twenty-one top donors giving at
least 40 percent to each party appeared in the bottom half of the list.144 Again, the
numbers are rough, but it would seem at least intuitively that a donor would spend more
money in giving equally to two parties than it would in making the bulk of its
contribution to one side or the other. That is, assume a donor has an amount $x in mind
below which it believes its contribution will not have the desired effect, whether that
effect is access, recognition, or something else, and an amount $y that is the maximum it
is willing to donate. Further assume that the donor believes that there exists an amount
$z past which an increased donation will yield diminishing returns as to the effect
desired, whatever that may be. The amount a donor gives to one party will be no lower
than the threshold $x and no higher than the ceiling $y, and, it seems logical, as close to
maximization point $z as the donor is able accurately to assess. Thus, a rational donor
giving to two parties should be giving at least twice $x, and optimally twice $z. Yet,
from the data, top donors giving in near-equal proportions to both major parties appear to
have a significantly lower valuation of $x and/or $z than do donors directing their giving
largely to a single party. Or perhaps single-party donors, tending to be less pragmatic
143
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and more issue-oriented, are less apt to be concerned with the value of $z and more likely
to approach the ceiling amount $y when contributing, even in the face of diminished
returns.145
The CRP data definitively show that many top donors gave a sizeable proportion
of their money to both Democrats and Republicans in the 2003-04 election cycle. They
also show that almost every top donor has given some money to both parties. Of the top
100 donors, only 2 gave 100 percent of their money to a single political party:146
Top Donors’ Donation Split Between Parties, 2003-04
Between 50-50 and 60-40 percent split:
Between 61-39 and 70-30:
Between 71-29 and 80-20:
Between 81-19 and 90-10:
Between 91-9 and 99-1:
100-0 split:

23 donors (23)
29 donors (29)
13 donors (13)
13 donors (13)
20 donors (20)
2 donors (2)

While such an overwhelmingly high incidence of cross-party giving is certainly
suggestive of a good deal of bet-hedging, it isn’t conclusive; per the discussion of
donation-splitting in Part III.A, we still do not know enough about these donors’ behavior
to confidently infer ex post favor-seeking. The percentages calculated by CRP are “based
on contributions from PACs, soft money donors and individuals giving $200 or more to
federal candidates, parties and leadership PACs, as reported to the Federal Election
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Commission.”147 Although the data for total contributions are further broken down by
the method of donation (PAC, individual, or, where applicable, soft money), the data for
the recipient of the donation, whether party or candidate, is not broken down at all. That
is, the numbers compiled show that AT&T gave 53 percent, or $1.6 million, of its $3
million in 2001-2002 contributions to Republicans and 47 percent, or $1.4 million to
Democrats.148 They also show that 73 percent of that money came from soft money
contributions, 20 percent from PACs, and 7 percent from individuals.149 But there is no
way to tell from this data how much of the $1.6 million given to Republicans came from
PACs versus soft money, or how much went to the Republican National Committee and
how much went to individual candidates.
Absent more detailed data, then, the premise of this paper that bet-hedging is
more than an incidental occurrence must largely be assumed. However, given the
extensive anecdotal reports in which donors are quoted indicating that they are hedging
their bets,150 and the suggestiveness of the CRP data (in which many, many top donors
give a substantial portion of their contribution to both parties), it seems to be a safe
assumption to make.
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IV. Why, How, and When: Questions About Bet-Hedging
Having ascertained that bet-hedging does occur and is likely fairly prevalent, this
paper now explores the details of bet-hedging strategy. Specifically, it asks three
questions: 1) Why do donors hedge their bets? What are they seeking in return that
justifies the cost of giving? 2) How do donors hedge their bets? What is the optimal
apportionment of donation dollars? 3) When do donors hedge their bets? What
conditions trigger a decision to hedge or not to hedge? And does it matter if the parties or
candidates know that the donor is spreading its money around?
Because of the dearth of analysis on the subject, this paper is less concerned with
answering all the questions it raises regarding bet-hedging than with raising them in the
first place. Each of the questions asked in this section might plausibly be the subject of a
separate, detailed examination; for now, however, I am content to touch upon each issue
and leave it alone. In gauging the appropriateness of a regulatory response, all that needs
be known about bet-hedging is that it is a rational strategy, that it leads to donor
expectation of ex post benefits, and that it is likely to persist absent regulation.
A. Why Do Donors Hedge Their Bets?
First principles first: why do donors give money at all? If, like votes, political
contributions are meant, first, to express a democratic preference for one candidate or
platform over competing alternatives and, second, to influence events in favor of that
candidate or platform, then bet-hedging fails on both fronts. By giving to competing
candidates or parties, a donor is neither expressing a preference for one over the other nor
attempting to effect a particular electoral outcome, just as someone who votes for two
opposing candidates is canceling her own vote, expressing no preference, and doing
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nothing to help either candidate win.151 Thus hedged-bet donations, like hedged-bet
votes, cannot rationally be justified as advancing a citizen’s personal (or, as is most often
the case, institutional) democratic interests.152
This is true even if the amounts given to each side are not equivalent. As
discussed earlier,153 if more money is given to one side than the other, then only the
difference between the contributions matters in the end. That is, if $x is given to
Candidate A and $x+y is given to competing Candidate B, only the donor’s contribution
of $y to Candidate B matters. Therefore, if Donor Z gives $40,000 to the Arkansas
Democratic Party and $60,000 to the Arkansas Republican Party in a nonfederal
election,154 only the $20,000 difference between the contributions matters in effecting a
preference for one over the other. If Donor Z’s sole intent is to demonstrate its
preference between the two candidates, there is no reason not to give $20,000 to the
Republicans and be done with it.
It may be that Donor Z wishes to give unequal amounts to each side in order to
signal the intensity of its preference. That is, perhaps it is not the absolute value of each
contribution that matters, but rather their value relative to one another. In this way,
assuming perfect information, the RNC would know that Donor Z valued them $20,000
151

See Keller, supra note 71 (quoting a PAC fundraiser criticizing the bet-hedging strategy and saying that
“if a PAC sees no significant difference between the two candidates . . . the better decision is to sit it out
and help the winner after the election.”).
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More so because donating twice, unlike voting twice, requires an expenditure of money. To vote for
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The lack of result is mitigated by the lack of outlay. Assuming some modicum of economic rationality, it
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greater than their opponents. This possibility is revisited in Part IV.C, infra, but for now
it is enough to say that this motivation, too, fails under the democratic preferences
rationale. If Donor Z does not care about securing a favorable ex post position for itself,
but wishes only to advance the prospects of its preferred party, then it shouldn’t matter
whether or not that party knows how much more Donor Z likes them than the
alternatives.
Assuming that Donor Z is a rational actor, the most plausible explanation for its
donating to competing candidates or parties is that it expects to receive ex post benefits
from the eventual winner. Just as voting for competing candidates is rational if everyone
who votes for the winning candidate is rewarded after the election, so too is bet- hedging
rational if a donor believes that it will be rewarded by giving to the winning side. This is
the crucial feature of bet-hedging that makes it more suspect, and more susceptible to
regulation, than regular donor behavior under the Buckley and McConnell frameworks: if
a donor hedges its bets, it is presumptively engaging in a quid pro quo transaction –
contributions now, benefits later.155
If a donor rationally believes that it will receive some desired benefit from either
side after the election, it logically follows that the two sides are ideologically consonant
to some degree on issues that are important to that donor. In other words, it would make
no sense for a bet-hedging donor to contribute money to a candidate if it did not believe
that that candidate, having won the election, would (and could) reward the donor for its
contribution. Let’s say Donor Z desires ex post influence in prohibiting the importation

154

Arkansas is one of the states allowing unlimited contributions to state party committees in state
elections. See State Party Contribution Limits, supra note 9.
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That these benefits may come in the form of increased access, which by itself is arguably insufficiently
troublesome to sustain regulation of political speech, is a possibility examined in Part V, infra.
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of under-priced widgets. It knows that Mr. Dem will provide that influence to his donors
in the event that he wins the election, while Mrs. Gop, if she wins, will not. In this case,
bet-hedging is not a rational strategy for Donor Z. It is better off conserving its resources
or giving the whole of its money to Mr. Dem.
So a bet-hedging donor expects to receive ex post benefits from whichever
candidate or party happens to gain control after the election. What might these benefits
entail? For the purposes of this paper, the particular ex post motivation of a donor
matters less than the fact that the ex post motivation exists at all; that one donor might be
seeking influence while another donor fears retaliation from not contributing in no way
implicates the normative value or constitutional viability of bet-hedging. (The one
potential exception to this statement are donations made for the purposes of increased
access. This problem is examined in Part V.) It is interesting, however, to note the many
and varied explanations that have been given for hedged-bet behavior. These are quickly
summarized here.
It should first be observed that even in the case of donations to competing
candidates, many donors will disavow the notion that anything specific is expected in
return. A spokesperson for telecommunications giant SBC, for example, offered this
explanation for his company’s split donations: “There are people in both parties who
support competitive telecommunications markets, which is what we support, so we give
to candidates of both parties and both party committees.”156 In justifying giving to both
party committees, this rationale fails to convince: along the lines of the discussion in Part
III.A, even if both parties propound favorable policies to SBC, there is no reason that it
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should give to both. Better in that case to save money for individual races in which
certain candidates favor SBC’s policy goals more than their competitors.
Other reasons given for hedged-bet donations that do not involve ex post favorseeking include neutrality/impartiality157 or a belief in the personal merits of each
candidate, 158 the reflection of a donor’s diverse membership,159 and the generalized
advancement of democracy.160 The first of these reasons largely begs the question; there
is no need to try and appear impartial or neutral unless the contributor seeks favorable
treatment from the eventual winner. In the words of a Connecticut Republican state party
official, “If someone is giving the same amount of funds, it’s obvious they are not hurt in
either way by the election of one candidate. . . . They do that to show that it’s not a
personal issue.”161 But if it is true that the donor is “not hurt in either way,” to what end
does it profit by signaling its impartiality to the candidates? The most logical answer, if
that is indeed the donor’s aim, is that the donor is seeking individualized ex post benefits.
Of course, the appearance of neutrality could be directed elsewhere than at the
political actors themselves. A corporation might wish to cultivate a public perception of
its evenhandedness and civic virtue.162 If this is so, however, there would seem to be
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cheaper or more effective ways to achieve this aim than to donate to competing
candidates or parties. Neutrality is handily communicated by not putting any money into
politics whatsoever; giving to no one runs less risk of public cynicism about the donor’s
motivations than giving to everyone. In the same way, if a potential donor is “so
impressed with both candidates after a round of interviews and questionnaires that they
[can’t] decide whom to support,” why not breathe easily, secure in the knowledge that the
electoral outcome will be favorable, and save some cash?163 All of which is not to say
that some donors do not give to opposing sides for exactly these reasons, merely that it
strains credibility to believe that most, or even many, of the donors who split their
donations are doing so in order to make others think that they are studiously apolitical or
to express their appreciation for such a solid field of candidates.
Similarly, it is perfectly plausible that some institutional donors give to both sides
in order most fully to represent the diversity of political views held by their members,
employees, or shareholders.164 But this rationale is rarely invoked by donors engaging in
apparent bet-hedging, does not account for individuals who give to competing political
actors, and is generally an unsatisfying rationale for the sheer prevalence of hedged-bet
donations within our political system.

of the five political parties represented in Germany's Bundestag. Both the donations and the fact that
Allianz gives just enough to require full disclosure are ‘an expression of our civic duty,’ says Nicolai
Tewes, the company's director of corporate relations.”).
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Garcia, supra note 61, at B1 (“Kay Behrens, chairwoman of the West Orange Political Alliance, said the
group's 17 members were so impressed with both candidates after a round of interviews and questionnaires
that they couldn't decide whom to support. So they gave each $500. ‘We got down to these two guys, went
back and forth, and just felt they were both strong candidates,’ Behrens said. ‘It's not hedging bets at all.’”).
164
Kent Cooper of Public Disclosure, Inc., agrees that this rationale is in play for certain donors: “You
have more PACs that are listening to their employees, and in many cases that's the safest thing for a PAC to
do so they represent their donor base.” Keller, supra note 71. See also Andrews, supra note 73, at 1A
(“Among the biggest contributors to both campaigns was the law firm Baker & Daniels, which records
show gave $ 103,460 to Daniels and $ 90,550 to Kernan. Baker & Daniels Chairman Brian Burke said the
bipartisanship reflects the differing political views of the lawyers who work at the firm as well as its roots.
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The argument that hedged-bet donors, by giving to both sides, advance and secure
the stability of representative democracy and the vitality of a two-party system – that they
are “civic patriots”165 – deserves a little more attention. This is an especially potent
defense of split giving because the actual effects of the practice are just as important as
the motivation of the donors. If donors are giving solely in order to support the American
political process or to be good citizens, then they are not looking for specific ex post
favors or benefits, and they are not hedging their bets.166 But even if donors are bethedging, they might be helping to sustain a healthy political system whether they mean to
or not. If the result of donation-splitting is positive overall, then perhaps this sort of
donor behavior should not be targeted for regulation.167
Nevertheless, the evidence again suggests that even if some donors are
contributing with the innocuous (and even laudable) goal of making sure that parties and
candidates have the resources to disseminate their message,168 much apparent bethedging behavior cannot be characterized in this fashion. Even where donors claim the
advancement of democracy as their motivation, such an explanation often seems overly

One of its founding partners served as a Republican governor and another served as a Democratic
governor.”).
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Slackman, supra note 26 (quoting Steven Weissman, associate director of policy at the Campaign
Finance Institute, as saying that “[h]istorically, double givers are often people seeking access to both
parties, rather than civic patriots.”).
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See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 73, at 1A (Indianapolis Colts owner Jim Irsay explaining his giving to
both Indiana gubernatorial candidates by saying, “I think of my participation as supporting the system,
rather than individual candidates, especially when the opponents are equally qualified, as in this year's
gubernatorial race.”).
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This objection to a regulatory response to bet-hedging is considered further in Part V.
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See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 58, at 1 (quoting a bet-hedging donor that “[i]t takes money to get the word
out. I’m sympathetic to the needs of the candidates.”); Friedman, supra note 75, at 13 (quoting a New
York real estate developer who donated the maximum allowable contribution to all mayoral candidates but
one because “they’re all excellent candidates, and . . . they all deserve the opportunity to present their
views.”); Garcia, supra note 61, at B1 (“‘We're involved in the community, and we want to make sure that
they have the wherewithal to at least get their message out,’ said Orlando Evora, a co-managing partner in
the Orlando office of the Greenberg Traurig law firm, which has also contributed the maximum to both
candidates.”).

48

pat and incomplete. As an example, take the Florida law firm that donated money,
through several PACs, to four Miami-Dade mayoral candidates in 2004 (one of these four
returned the donation).169 As quoted in the Miami Herald, the founder of the firm
explained his support of multiple mayoral campaigns by saying that there are “five good,
strong, qualified candidates” in the election.170 This response raises two reasonable
questions. First, if all five candidates are good, strong, and qualified, why is the firm
only donating to four? The article proffers a legitimate explanation for this, reporting
that the law firm’s checks were disbursed before the fifth candidate entered the race.171
Second, if the firm would, as it appears on the strength of its words, be happy with all of
the candidates as the next Miami-Dade mayor, why give to any at all? The general
inference that a donor must be seeking ex post benefits when it gives to competing
candidates can only be strengthened by the knowledge that the donor would find any of
the available field of candidates an acceptable victor. This admittedly sidesteps the
advancement of democracy rationale, which does carry some strength. But it suggests
that, under a system in which public disclosure is valued and candidates easily can
discover the source of their funds, it is often very difficult to separate an advancement of
democracy in which recognition of giving is an incidental effect from a desire to be
recognized by all candidates, whereby democracy just happens to be advanced.172
Elections in which candidates identify themselves as representatives of a
particular political party, as is the case in most state and federal races, highlight a
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different vulnerability of the civic patriotism explanation. Bet-hedging behavior is
directed almost uniformly at the two major parties.173 In the interests of promoting
political speech and sustaining democratic choice, it would make sense for at least some
donors who split their contributions to give money to the parties or candidates that most
demonstrably need it: those with no appreciable current voice in the American political
system. Yet candidates with little chance of winning an election receive, by and large, no
financial support from those donors that are happily supplementing the campaign coffers
of the well-financed, front-running campaigns. Dennis Kucinich, for example, collected
precious few donations for his failed 2004 presidential run from donors who had given to
Bush and Kerry.174 Ralph Nader’s top contributors over the past fourteen years bear
almost no relationship to those of the major-party presidential candidates.175 Surely
financial support has great marginal utility to the campaigns of Kucinich and Nader; what
better way to foster democracy than by funding those messages that are least heard? To
the extent that a bet-hedging donor does not give to these candidates solely because they
stand no shot of victory, the advancement of democracy argument sounds a flat note. In
the case of Nader, at least, it may be that donors direct their monies to Democrats and
Republicans because they prefer the political stability of a two-party system. There are
compelling normative arguments for having only two strong political parties. Such a
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preference is perfectly valid.176 But the two-party system is in scant need of protection or
support; whether or not donors who give only to the Democrats and Republicans intend
their money to safeguard these institutions from encroachment by competitors, it
arguably has no appreciable effect in that regard.177 Richard Hasen notes that “[t]he twoparty system in the United States may be at its strongest point in history.”178 There is
little evident danger that the Democratic Party would cease to be an effective foil for the
Republicans (or vice-versa) if donors were required to choose no more than one
candidate from either of these parties to support in a given race.179
One point potentially in favor of the civic patriotism argument is donor behavior
with regard to 527 groups. Such groups, as discussed in Part II.A, infra, exist in large
part specifically in order to increase political speech, whether by voter mobilization, get
out the vote efforts, or advertisements touting particular issues. Moreover, the
electioneering in which 527s engage cannot include express advocacy of a candidate, or
else the groups become subject to federal contribution limits under FECA.180 It is true
that the line between the sort of electioneering that subjects a 527 to FECA’s limits and
the sort that does not is often quite blurred.181 Nevertheless, contributions to 527 groups
serve to advance democracy (by mobilizing, registering, and educating voters) at least as
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well as, and possibly better than, contributions to party committees or to candidates.
Donors wishing to be civic patriots are free to give unlimited amounts of money to
increase the political speech of 527 groups and help inform and energize the public;
contributions to candidates and parties, even if similarly motivated by civic goodwill, are
restricted by federal law.
One might expect, then, if civic patriotism drives donors to contribute to
competing parties, to see those same donors also give to 527 groups, where much more
money can be spent increasing political speech without having to throw support behind a
particular political party (or, as it happens, parties). One might also see individuals and
organizations giving to multiple and competing 527s, if facilitation of the medium is truly
more important than endorsement of the message. In fact, it’s a mixed bag: many top
donors to competing parties and candidates tend also to donate to 527 groups, and to
engage in bet-hedging behavior while they do; Boeing, for example, has given money
both to Americans for a Republican Majority182 and to the New Democrat Network.183
Conversely, however, top donors to 527 groups are generally ideologically consistent
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regarding the sorts of groups to which they donate, and do not hedge their bets.184 It is
true that 527s themselves are often quite partisan in their commitment to single issues or
ideologies – EMILY’s List and the Club for Growth being illustrative examples.
However, from a disinterested, civic patriot standpoint, giving to opposing 527s would
presumably have a similar net positive effect on the political system as giving to
opposing parties or candidates.185 Definitive answers on donor behavior toward 527s
cannot be had until the dust has settled following BCRA; for now, it is enough to say that
donors who split their donations both to competing candidates and parties and to
ideologically inapposite 527s might more plausibly attribute their pattern of giving to
civic patriotism and generalized advancement of democracy than those donors who give
to competing candidates and parties but who give only to one sort of 527 group, or who
eschew giving to 527s altogether.186
Back to the form that ex post benefits for bet-hedging might take. First and most
basic is the expectation that the donor will receive something positive and individualized
from the winner. This might take the form of specific ex post influence, special access,
or general relationship-building. See, for example, the Republican Party’s Team 100,
which conferred benefits upon donors giving more than $100,000.187
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Alternatively, some donors may contribute to both sides because they fear
retaliation. In the words of Bruce Cain, framing a frequent complaint of lobbyists,
“legislators force groups to give money in order to maintain access to the legislator, or to
keep the legislator from taking some threatened action (that is, so-called "tree-shaking"
activities).”188 There is likely some basis for this view – according to a 2000 survey of
300 corporate executives, “at least 51 percent…agreed that turning down requests for
campaign contributions could bring retaliation in the form of adverse legislation.”189
Gerald Greenwald, former CEO of United Airlines, puts it plainly in a declaration made
in connection with the McConnell litigation:
Business and labor leaders believe, based on their experience, that
disappointed Members, and their party colleagues, may shun or disfavor
them because they have not contributed. Equally, these leaders fear that if
they refuse to contribute (enough), competing interests who do contribute
generously will have an advantage in gaining access to and influencing
key Congressional leaders on matters of importance to the company or
union.190
Although Greenwald’s statement applies to soft money generally without
singling out bet-hedging, Bill Phelps, a lobbyist whose oil company contributed $5,000 to
each candidate in the 1998 Texas lieutenant governor race, attributes his hedged-bet
giving to a desire to avoid negative repercussions: “If you don’t give…you’d probably
alienate both of them.”191 Whether or not these repercussions are real or imagined is
essentially beside the point; if donors will give to both sides on the basis of perceived
188
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benefits, it’s easy to imagine them doing so on in the interest of preventing perceived
negative consequences.
Finally, donors might not seek anything tangible at all from their hedged-bet
contributions, at least in the short term. Some contributors might give to competing
candidates in order to support a particular political characteristic that both candidates
share, in the hope that each candidate, regardless whether he wins the election, will find
future success within his own party.192 Others might be mindful of alienating candidates
who have been helpful to them in the past. In the 2004 South Dakota Senate race,
Norfolk Southern Railroad contributed both to incumbent Tom Daschle and to thenRepresentative John Thune. A Norfolk Southern executive explained this double giving
by saying that “Senator Daschle has been helpful to the railroad industry and his
opponent has been helpful to the railroad industry, so you have two friends running
against each other. . . . I think they would prefer we give to both rather than not give at
all.”193
Many donors claim to give to both sides out of personal friendship with the
candidates194 or with those soliciting money for the candidates195 – or, in one case, out of
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appreciation for a timely use of the Heimlich maneuver.196 The friendship rationale is
particularly plausible in local races, where it is more likely that a hedged-bet giver would
know each candidate personally and where the desire for continued amity would be
strong.197 Similarly, donors might view the contributions as a precondition of “managing
their relationships with political actors;”198 a cover charge, if you will. In this regard, it’s
important to remember that political contributions are not a one-time game – it may help
three cycles down the line to have been a loyal and consistent contributor to a particular
party, even if it nets the donor nothing right now.
One objection to the notion that donors can hedge their bets by contributing to
party committees is that committees, unlike elected officials, cannot advance a donor’s
interests in any concrete way. The RNC serves on no Senate subcommittee, writes no
bills, votes on nothing. This is true, in its way, but it misses the larger picture: by
establishing itself as a big-money Republican contributor, a donor gains access to the
Republican policy process in a way that it would not if it were only contributing to
individual candidates. Contributing to parties, for example, allows donors the
opportunity to underwrite party events,199 gaining valuable and broad-based
acknowledgment as a friend of the cause.

convictions are,' he said.”); Babcock, supra note 160, at A10 (“[P]eople respond because they don’t want to
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Also, donating to parties effectively gives a contributor value on every dollar
spent: if Donor Z gives money to competing candidates, only one of them will win.
Donor Z’s additional outlay in contributing to the losing candidate must thus be recouped
in the value of the ex post benefits derived from the winner. By contrast, if Donor Z
gives money to both party committees, it may gain access and influence with both parties,
rather than just the one in control.
B. How Do Donors Hedge Their Bets?
How are donations split? What is the decisional process? Some sort of
calculation must be made by the donor in deciding how much to give each side.
Sometimes, as we’ve seen, donors apportion their money equally. This seems the safest
bet. But when they do not – and most of the top donors seem to donate different amounts
to each side – how do they figure out who gets what?
At base, the amount of a donor’s contribution – say, that of Donor Z – may simply
be a function of how much they are asked to give. If this is the case, then the differential
amount given is not an indication that Donor Z values one side over the other – rather,
one party or candidate has just solicited more money than their competitor. Donor Z may
use other external indicia in deciding how much it will give, as well. If a $50,000
donation to the Democrats confers the same benefits as a $75,000 to the Republicans,
then, all else being equal, a bet-hedging donor is likely to give $25,000 less to the former
than the latter. A similar possibility is that Donor Z will give enough to each party or
candidate as to pass the monetary threshold that triggers receipt of certain benefits – like

http://www.abcnews.com. And, post-BCRA, national party conventions are one of the only places where
donors can contribute an unlimited amount to federal political actors. See Part II, supra.
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the Republicans’ Team 100, mentioned earlier.200 Or Donor Z may gauge the giving
behavior of those that have already contributed; giving in the same proportion as those
whose expected benefits match Donor Z’s, or giving more to one party or candidate than
those who Donor Z seeks to outstrip.
Let’s assume, however, that the decision to give $x to one candidate and $y to
another is a purely internal calculation. What might this calculation look like? The
perceived benefits of giving to both must be sufficiently preferable to the perceived
benefits of giving to only one to justify the additional financial outlay. Put another way,
by giving to both sides, the donor is purchasing certainty. If Donor Z knows that it will
receive benefits from the winner no matter who the winner is, then it behooves Donor Z
to contribute to both sides if the outcome of the race is uncertain. The more uncertain the
outcome, the more evenly Donor Z should spread its donations.
The distribution also depends on whether Donor Z has a fixed total sum that it is
willing to contribute, or whether its total donation is dependent upon its calculation of the
optimal split. That is, if Donor Z’s ceiling amount of $y (see Part III.B, supra) is
$50,000, then its preferred ex post position must be a) sufficiently certain and/or b)
sufficiently desirable to justify splitting this $50,000 in order to maximize its chances of
attaining that position. An equal distribution of its donation, no matter how much it
values the ex post position, must result in $25,000 to one candidate and $25,000 to the
other if the outcome is uncertain (and up to $50,000 to one candidate if the outcome is
certain). If, on the other hand, Donor Z plans to spend at least $50,000 on one candidate
– and up to $50,000 on the other candidate – to achieve certainty of ex post position, then
that position must be sufficiently desirable to justify spending more than $50,000 in order
200

Babcock, supra note 160.
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to attain it. In this case, an equal distribution of Donor Z’s total contribution could result
in $50,000 going to each candidate (if the outcome is initially uncertain and Donor Z
values certainty highly), or $50,000 going only to one candidate (if the outcome is
initially certain and/or Donor Z does not value certainty very highly).
While the probability of each side’s success factors into the calculation, Donor Z
must also take into account the marginal value of each donation. This is true in two
ways. First, it may be that there is a threshold amount that a candidate must receive in
order to ensure that Donor Z will receive its desired ex post benefits. Let’s say that
Donor Z knows that any contribution under $25,000 will not result in the desired ex post
benefits, even if the recipient of that contribution is the winner of the election. If Donor
Z has only $50,000 to split up between the candidates, it has only two viable choices: it
can give between $25,000-$50,000 to one candidate, or it can give $25,000 to each
candidate. Any other distribution of the money will result in one candidate receiving at
least $1 but less than $25,000, and the money spent on that candidate will be wasted even
if he wins. This changes the way Donor Z’s valuation of the ex post benefit informs its
splitting strategy—if the benefit is valued at less than $50,000, there is no point in
splitting its donation equally even if each side has a 50 percent chance of winning the
election. Donor Z is better served spending $25,000 on one candidate and keeping the
rest.
Similarly, marginal value also plays a part to the extent that there is an upper
bound to the relationship between donation and expected benefit. Let’s say Donor Z has
$100,000, and plans to spend at least $50,000 of that money on Candidate A. Assume
also that Donor Z would receive no greater benefits from Candidate A by giving
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$100,000 than he would by giving $50,000. Donor Z is better served spending its second
$50,000 on Candidate B than on Candidate A, even if Candidate B is not likely to win the
election. If Donor Z gives $50,000 to each, it secures a positive result no matter the
winner. If Donor Z gives $100,000 to Candidate A, it secures no better result from
Candidate A than if it had given $50,000, and receives no benefit should Candidate B
happen to win. Therefore, dollars $1-$50,000 to Candidate B have greater marginal
value than dollars $50,001-$100,000 to Candidate A. Richard Neuborne makes this point
regarding free speech and political spending when he says, “even if one agrees that a
close correlation exists between speech and the first dollar spent to fund it, or even the
thousandth, or ten thousandth dollar, it does not follow that the one-to-one correlation
between money and speech holds at the millionth, or ten millionth, or billionth dollar
levels.”201 Therefore, whether or not the dollar-to-benefit relationship is linear or
asymptotic (and, if the latter, at what point benefits cease to accrue) should inform a
donor’s calculation of its contribution split.202
A final question regarding the apportionment of hedged-bet contributions: How
might extreme splits in donations be explained, in which a miniscule amount is given to
one side and a large amount to the other? See the donation behavior of the United Auto
Workers, mentioned earlier – from 1989-2002, UAW gave 99 percent of its money to
Democrats, and only 1 percent to Republicans.203 Assuming that this disparity is the
result of bet-hedging rather than donation-splitting, how is the 1 percent given to the
GOP a useful outlay of money? A potential explanation for this appears in the next
section.
201
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Neuborne, supra note 4, at 115.
See Part III.B, supra, for further discussion on this point.
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C. When Do Donors Hedge Their Bets?
It seems logical that bet-hedging is more likely in close races. This assumption is
supported both by analysis (see Part IV.B) and observation204 – where the outcome of a
race is uncertain, a donor desiring ex post benefits will have to spread its money in order
to ensure having backed the eventual winner. As Rep. Richard Baker (R-La.) said of the
2004 presidential election, “If you think Kerry is going to win, but you’re not sure, you
give to both sides.”205 Conversely, there is little reason for a donor to give to multiple
candidates in a race that looks to be a landslide, unless the donor wishes to use their
support for a doomed candidate as future political capital (“Hey, we supported your guy
way back when!”).206 The desire to back only those candidates and parties that have
legitimate chances of gaining political power must also explain why bet-hedging is
confined to the two major parties (rather than, say, the Greens, the Libertarians, and the
Socialists).207 The propensity of donors to hedge their bets in certain types of elections
and not others is fertile ground for future empirical analysis; one such question might be
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whether bet-hedging is more likely in races with no incumbent candidates. Probably so,
since, as already noted, bet-hedging is more rational when the outcome of the race is less
certain; because incumbents are almost always heavily favored, there is little point in
donors hedging their bets.
More interesting is a question of information: does it matter if the parties or
candidates themselves know that a donor is hedging its bets? Is a party likely to treat a
donor better if that donor did not give to the other side? And even if parties accept bethedging as a typical donor strategy, do they pay attention to the amount they are given
relative to their competitor? There is no clear answer to these questions. As mentioned
earlier, Republicans have taken steps to preference donors giving GOP candidates greater
than 75 percent of their total contributions.208 Others, like Connecticut Democratic Party
Chairman George Jepsen, believe that candidates care more about securing a donor’s
money for themselves than about worrying whether the donor has also given to their
opponent.209 And there is also some evidence that parties encourage, or at least exploit,
the practice of giving to both sides. Witness the testimony of a CEO, as quoted in
McConnell v. FEC:
[I]f you're giving a lot of soft money to one side, the other side knows. For
many economically-oriented donors, there is a risk in giving to only one
side, because the other side may read through FEC reports and have staff
or a friendly lobbyist call and indicate that someone with interests before a
certain committee has had their contributions to the other side noticed.
They'll get a message that basically asks: 'Are you sure you want to be
208
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giving only to one side? Don't you want to have friends on both sides of
the aisle?' If your interests are subject to anger from the other side of the
aisle, you need to fear that you may suffer a penalty if you don't give. . . .
[D]uring the 1990's, it became more and more acceptable to call someone,
saying you saw he gave to this person, so he should also give to you or the
person's opponent.210
Mention of the anonymous campaign finance system proposed by Ian Ayres and Jeremy
Bulow is again appropriate here:211 if recipients of donations did not know who had
contributed to them, there would be no way to present an ex post reward to those donors
who gave to the winning team. There would therefore be no reason to bet-hedge, as only
the democratic preferences rationale for campaign contributions would hold sway.
Related is the possible use of donations to signal intensity of donor preferences.
Many commentators have remarked on the cardinal nature of campaign contributions;212
this allows political actors to see how strongly contributors care about particular issues.
Votes, by contrast, are binary expressions of preference which bundle the entirety of a
political platform into a single valuation. This may provide an explanation for extreme
splits in contributions – perhaps giving 99 percent to one side and 1 percent to the other is
akin to tipping a penny in a restaurant after receiving awful service.213 In this case, the
donor wants the the recipient of the 99 percent to know how much more highly it values
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them by giving them a benchmark of “anti-preference” by which to compare their own
contribution.

V. Regulating Bet-Hedging
A. Can Bet-Hedging Be Regulated?
A normative argument in favor of formal curbs on hedged-bet behavior cannot
easily be separated, at least at first, from an inquiry into the constitutionality of such
regulation. This is not to say that if the regulation of bet-hedging is constitutional it is
normatively desirable. Indeed, there is much government activity that is permissible but
unwise. But in this instance, the clearest thing to be said against bet-hedging is that it it
lends itself, as I have argued, to a reasonable inference that those who hedge their bets do
so with the expectation of receiving value for their dollars after the fact. To the extent
that this looks from the outside like political influence being exchanged for money, bethedging behavior carries with it the appearance of corruption.214 And the appearance of
corruption, even with nothing more, may constitutionally be regulated. As the Buckley
Court stated, “Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance
of improper influence is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative
Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.”215
This is important because it is unclear whether bet-hedging has anything other
than its unsavory appearance to recommend it for regulation. There is no concrete
evidence that explicit quid pro quos exist with hedged-bet donations any more than with
donations to single candidates or parties (although they may, in both circumstances), and
the increased access and facetime that political contributions will buy, while arguably
214
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undesirable, are probably not sufficiently compelling by themselves to support regulation
as a constitutional matter.216 The Court’s definition of corruption has been drawn
broadly, but not so broadly as to encompass mere access to candidates and officeholders.
The appearance of corruption, however, is a compelling state interest on its own, and one
which may take the sale of political access for money into account:
To be sure, mere favoritism or opportunity for influence alone is
insufficient to justify regulation. As the record demonstrates, it is the
manner in which parties have sold access to federal candidates and
officeholders that has given rise to the appearance of undue influence.
Implicit (and, as the record shows, sometimes explicit) in the sale of
access is the suggestion that money buys influence. It is no surprise then
that purchasers of such access unabashedly admit that they are seeking to
purchase just such influence. It was not unwarranted for Congress to
conclude that the selling of access gives rise to the appearance of
corruption.217
The reasons that the Court finds the appearance of corruption to be a compelling state
interest are the same reasons that regulating bet-hedging because of its appearance of
corruption would be a normatively desirable thing to do – notably, the prevention of “the
eroding of public confidence in the electoral process” and the protection of “public
participation in political debate.”218 “Take away Congress’ authority to regulate the
appearance of undue influence,” the McConnell Court warns, “and the cynical
assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to
take part in democratic governance.”219 Favor-seeking, then, is undesirable societally for
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the same reasons Congress’s desire to prevent it is given such weight in Buckley and
McConnell: the existence of political quid pro quos, both in fact and in perception, erodes
the legitimacy of our representative democracy, and raises disturbing questions of
money-driven influence. Despite this, commentators have suggested, often persuasively,
that regulating on the basis of the appearance of corruption is an unworkable standard,
and one which goes too far in corralling legitimate and harmless political behavior.220 It
is certainly possible that remediation of the appearance of corruption engendered by bethedging is not a good enough reason to pass a law forbidding the practice; I consider this
below. As a constitutional matter, though, I have little doubt that, were Congress or a
state legislature to prohibit donations to competing candidates or competing parties
within the same election cycle, the Supreme Court would uphold the constitutionality of
the legislation on appearance of corruption grounds, especially given the Court’s own
dicta on the subject.221 Of course, the Court could nevertheless strike down the
legislation as not being sufficiently closely drawn, a danger which, as I discuss infra,
might be particularly difficult to avoid when attempting to regulate bet-hedging.
The Court’s McConnell decision must surely stand as an indication that the
constitutionality of political contribution limits is alive and well, so long as those limits
can be tied to a compelling state interest. One could argue, however, that any proposed
regulation of bet-hedging would necessarily go further than did the legislation at issue in
220
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McConnell. BCRA merely subjects all donations to national party committees to
contribution limits under FECA; it doesn’t actually prohibit a contributor from giving to a
particular candidate or party. By contrast, regulating the practice of bet-hedging would
more severely constrain the freedom of donors to give to whoever they want – a donor
that had contributed to Mr. Dem would be forbidden from contributing to Mr. Dem’s
competitor, Mrs. Gop, in the same election cycle. Such a blanket restriction of free
speech and associational rights goes beyond what the Court has so far sanctioned in its
campaign finance jurisprudence.
There is some precedent for non-monetary limitations on donor freedom; the
long-standing statutory prohibition on direct political contributions by corporations and
unions comes immediately to mind. Further, although denial of certiorari should not be
taken as a comment on the merits of the lower court ruling, the Supreme Court has in the
past few years declined to hear challenges to state supreme court decisions upholding
legislation in which certain classes of donors (out-of-state residents, in Alaska, and the
casino industry, in Louisiana) were prohibited from giving anything at all.222 And the
fairly small scope of behavior that would be regulated by a ban on bet-hedging may be
relevant as well. As the McConnell Court noted, “not every minor restriction on parties’
otherwise unrestrained ability to associate is of constitutional dimension.”223
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B. Should Bet-Hedging Be Regulated?
In this paper, I have argued that bet-hedging, more than campaign contributions
generally, suggests an expectation of influence on the part of the donor. Indeed, bethedging is almost paradigmatic in its elicitation of world-weary cynicism. It has become
a truism of campaign finance that big donors will give to both sides in order to ensure
that they get in bed with the eventual winner. But, constitutionality aside, is this a good
enough reason to target bet-hedging for regulation? As Jonathan Krasno and Frank
Sorauf state, “citizens skeptical about the influence of large donations can find agreement
from majorities in Congress, from donors, from lobbyists, from reporters and editorial
writers, and from academics.”224 If the influence of money in politics is a problem, it is a
problem in many more respects than donors giving to competing sides. And,
comparatively, the cynicism evoked by bet-hedging is peculiarly free of outrage; people
may agree that it is not ideal, but that hedged-bet behavior ‘appears’ corrupt is itself
hardly responsible for all, or even many, of the ills of our campaign finance system.
So can a strong normative case for regulation be made without leaning too much
on the “vague and subjective” argument of the appearance of corruption?225 This is a
tricky question; most charges that can be levelled against bet-hedging apply equally to all
forms of private campaign contributions, and some that hit their mark for campaign
contributions in general, such as “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth . . . that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for [a]
corporation’s political ideas,”226 are less clearcut when it comes to donations that
neutralize each other by being given to competing candidates or parties, and that are
224
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forwarding a political idea not supported by the public only insofar as the idea itself is
shared by the Democrats and Republicans receiving the contributions. By the same
token, however, bet-hedging could be said to be more pernicious than other forms of
donation precisely because it isn’t, and can’t be, rationally justified by reference to
democratic preferences or ideological sorting – to the extent opposing sides disagree, a
donor is not forwarding its own policy views if it gives to both of them. And to the
extent the two sides agree, the donor arguably accrues just as much of a benefit if it saves
its money, because its preferred policies will be forwarded regardless.
Another response that distinguishes hedged-bet behavior from typical
contributions and argues that the former should be prohibited even if the latter should not
is the notion that neither donor nor recipient, at base, really want to be involved in the
process of bet-hedging. In effect, this argument posits a sort of prisoners’ dilemma:
donors would rather not spend the money, candidates and officeholders would rather not
stump for it, and both sides only persist in the practice out of fear that they will find
themselves in competitive disadvantage to other donors and other candidates and
officeholders if they do not.227 Under this conception, forced cessation of bet-hedging
behavior would redound to the mutual benefit of all.228 Burt Neuborne’s observation that
candidates’ “own best interests would almost certainly be served by mutually observed
limits on campaign spending, but . . . unilateral action is fatal and a privately negotiated
solution almost impossible to achieve” is equally relevant to candidates’ ceaseless
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solicitation of campaign contributions;229 a former Congressman once told me that fully
half of his waking life while in office was spent on the phone trying to reach his daily
contribution goal. And recall the testimony of the CEO that, because both parties know
when a donor has given to one and not the other, and will often specifically solicit money
from donors that have only made unilateral contributions, “there is a risk in giving to only
one side.”230 In these respects, neither the act of giving nor the act of fundraising,
especially in regard to hedged-bet donations, can be seen as wholly voluntary acts.231
Freeing both donors and politicians from the time- and money-consuming cycle of
contributions may be as impossible as candidates agreeing to end the arms race of
campaign spending, but imposing a prohibition on donations which, by their very nature,
cancel each other out anyway is a legitimate reason to favor regulation of bet-hedging.232
The conclusion must be, I think, that there are good but not overwhelming
arguments for prohibiting hedged-bet behavior. Moreover, none of the bases for
opposing campaign regulation in general resonate with especial strength when applied to
contributions to competing candidates or parties. Some, like the ideological sorting
theory, are, if anything, less persuasive than usual.233 It is reasonable to oppose a
regulatory response to bet-hedging on the grounds that it limits donor freedom qua donor
freedom, but this freedom is not an absolute, and the value of eliminating such blatantly
favor-seeking behavior as bet-hedging from the campaign finance framework is arguably

229

Neuborne, supra note 46, at 1067 (1999).
124 S. Ct. at 663 n.47 (quoting from McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 510 (D.D.C.) (2003)).
231
Cf. Burt Neuborne, Is Money Different?, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1617 (1999) (arguing that the lack of a
government-imposed campaign spending cap hinders the autonomy of candidates and officeholders).
232
It may also be said that prohibiting donors from giving to directly competing candidates or parties is,
comparatively, an extremely minimal burden on their speech and associative rights. Under such a
regulatory scheme, the donor would still be at liberty to donate to as many different candidates (in different
parties!) as it liked, so long as they were not running against each other.
233
See generally Bronars & Lott, supra note 12.
230

70

not insignificant. Finally, the civic patriotism argument – that donors who give to both
sides are contributing to a vibrant democracy and making the democratic political process
itself more fully possible – has some strength but, as an initial matter at least, is not
convincing: it is a striking proposition indeed, and one which requires evidentiary
support, that were the total contributions of all bet-hedging donors roughly halved,234 our
system of democratic governance would ultimately be very much worse off.
Nevertheless, every act of regulation has unexpected costs and unintended
consequences,235 and there isreason to think that regulating bet -hedging would create
more problems than it solves. First, it is unclear that a prohibition on giving to competing
candidates or parties would actually deter hedged-bet behavior. There is a potential
hydraulic effect, providing incentive for donors to redouble their presence in Washington
D.C. (or, if the bet-hedging prohibition is statewide, in the state capital) through other
means, such as lobbying.236 Second, although the effects of bet-hedging regulation on
donor behavior can only be inferred, it seems likely that a ban on bet-hedging, if effective
as a deterrent, would either force large donors to choose a side (or sides, when giving in
multiple races) at which to direct the whole of their contributions, or result in them
leaving the campaign finance playing field entirely. Both of these scenarios could result
in an outcome more normatively undesirable than bet-hedging itself.
For the first, donors could either continue giving relative to their historic levels
(that is, the $6.5 million that Goldman Sachs has split evenly between the Democrats and
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Republicans in the 2004 cycle237 would all still be contributed in a post-regulation
regime, just in ways that do not constitute bet-hedging), or, because they no longer have
to give to both sides in a particular race, drastically lower their total giving (so Goldman
Sachs would save around $3 million),238 essentially halving the overall contributions to
each side. If donors continued to give as much money as they do now, and simply
targeted it in more concentrated doses, this would conceivably trigger a reaction on the
part of candidates and parties competing for the larger slices of the pie. Competing
candidates might be drawn together centripetally in order to maximize their appeal to the
widest swath of donors, if bet-hedging were prohibited, or they might seek to separate
themselves and stake out newly distinct policy positions to make themselves the clear
choice of discerning donors. If, instead, contributors lowered their total amount of
giving, this would also force candidates and parties to adjust, either by spending less
money or by seeking alternative sources of campaign funds. The latter may be more
feasible than ever, now that Howard Dean has revitalized grassroots fundraising.239
Alternatively, regulation of bet-hedging might push some corporate donors out of
the practice of giving money altogether. While it is unlikely that a desire to be seen as
non-ideological drives institutional donors to hedge their bets in the first place,240 a
reflexive fear of being seen as too ideological (or even an inability to come to a
consensus among its officers regarding which candidates and parties to support) might
cause large donors who are forbidden from bet-hedging to severely cut their level of
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campaign contributions, especially if, as noted above, there are other avenues (like
lobbying) by which they can try to gain access and influence. Institutional donors might
simply play it safe, weighing the marginal value of contributing to one side in an
uncertain election as less than the benefit the donors could expect to receive if their guy
were to win, and withdraw entirely. If this happens, fears of undercutting or destabilizing
a democratic process that, for good or ill, is powered by large campaign contributions
start to become justified. As a counterpoint, it is perhaps useful to note that BCRA’s
sweeping restrictions on sizeable donations have not appreciably, as yet, contributed to
the downfall of our political system.
A prohibition on bet-hedging would likely remove some money from politics –
perhaps a great deal of money. Say a Donor Z gives $x to Candidate A and $y to
competing Candidate B, where both amounts are the product of some presumptively
rational calculus in which the donor takes into account the likelihood that each candidate
will win, the amount (and proportion) given to the candidates by other donors, the
ideological resonance of each candidate with the donor (on the one hand, a resonant
candidate will be more likely to pursue policies favorable to the donor without a large
contribution; on the other hand, giving a lot of money to a non-resonant candidate might
be utterly futile), and so on. Now say bet-hedging is prohibited. The donor can 1) give
money to one of the two candidates; 2) give money to neither of the two candidates; or 3)
violate the law and give money to both of the candidates. Assuming decent enforcement
mechanisms, let's discount the likelihood of 3). Even if the Donor Z chooses 1), it is
extremely unlikely to continue to donate $x+$y. (Although the closer the election, the
more likely it would be that the donor would give as much in a non-bet-hedging world as
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it would in a bet-hedging world.) The calculus is completely different. It's hardly even
clear that the donor would necessarily give $x or $y to the candidate; the revised donation
amount might be smaller than either.
The framing of bet-hedging regulation is also problematic. Specifically, it is
difficult to word the restrictions so that they will eliminate obvious loopholes that would
allow the practice of bet-hedging to continue while remaining sufficiently closely drawn
as to withstand constitutional scrutiny. As an example, a statute that treats all employees
of Donor Z as a single entity for the purposes of regulating bet-hedging – so that Joe in
Accounting couldn’t give to the DNC if Amy in Personnel had already given to the RNC
– is almost ridiculously untenable, and would surely be struck down by the courts if it
were, by some fluke, passed into law. But many alternative formulations of the statute
would allow donors, if they chose, to bundle employee contributions in such a way as to
continue, effectively, to give money to both sides.241 Perhaps a prohibition on corporate
officers, their spouses, and corporate PACs would be narrowly drawn enough to prevent
overbreadth while regulating most or all hedged-bet behavior.

VI. Conclusion
It may be that a regulatory cure for bet-hedging is worse than the disease itself.
But this does not mean that the practice of giving to competing candidates or parties is
necessarily benign, or that the subject does not warrant greater attention and analysis. In
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri PAC, the Court stated that:
In speaking [in Buckley v. Valeo] of “improper influence” and
“opportunities for abuse” in addition to “quid pro quo arrangements,” we
recognized a concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but
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extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the
wishes of large contributors. These were the obvious points behind our
recognition that Congress could constitutionally address the power of
money “to influence governmental action” in ways “less blatant and
specific” than bribery.
Donor bet-hedging, in appearing to distill the act of contributing money to a simple
calculus of covering one’s own bases because one has the resources to do so, fits squarely
within the sort of behavior that has been looked on with opprobrium by scholars, judges,
legislators, and the public alike. Unless and until it is impractical or impossible, as it
would be under a system of anonymous giving,242 for a well-heeled donor to achieve
recognition – and through it increased access and a maximized chance at ex post
influence – simply by spreading its money amongst all legitimate candidates for a
political office, bet-hedging will be endemic to our system of campaign finance. If we do
not wish to regulate it, we should at least attempt to understand it.
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